POLS 354 Final

Section 1 – Question 1
Approaches to National Security – Cold War to Present

During the Cold War, the realist school of international relations rose to prominence, guided by fears of nuclear weaponry and a fundamental responsibility to protect the nation-state from an external military attack. Since this era, however, the security of the nation-state has been redefined to encapsulate the personal security of the citizens residing within it. Brian C. Schmidt explains that there is a “mainstream understanding of national security as an armed defense of territory and core values from foreign threats,” but that this belief does not define which grand theory best preserves a state's national security (164). Even though mainstream America agrees that its core values should be defended by arms, the concepts of “core values” and “armed defense” are both subjective. Because national security is now conceptualized in terms of human security, the realist approach to international relations is no longer sufficient.

The highly subjective concept of “core values” is best conveyed through the Jacksonian approach to national security. Through this approach, America is viewed as a “folk community with a strong sense of common values and common destiny.” Its people respond to notions such as “honor, independence, courage and military pride,” and they are dedicated to the unified camaraderie associated with protecting the “homeland,” Christian principles, and gun ownership. Jacksonian ideals, however, were exploited after 9/11, as the event was interpreted by Jacksonians as a clear battle between good and evil, the civilized versus the uncivilized (Kiersey). The initial ideology that the United States had a right to retribution faded once evidence began surfacing indicating that the factors surrounding the conflict were not black and white, and that moral ambiguities were inevitable in such a climate. The United States invaded Iraq under the “mainstream understanding” that it was deploying armed defense to protect the nation's “core values.” However, this war is not being fought in the same climate as the Cold War. No nuclear weaponry was located in Iraq, and mainstream America's “core values” have been exploited for some other purpose. The Jacksonian approach to foreign policy, then, has been discredited because it has been abused. Walter Russell Mead, who identified the four various approaches to national security, claimed that “Jacksonian political philosophy is often an instinct rather than an ideology, a culturally shaped outlook that the individual may not have worked out intellectually, a set of beliefs and emotions rather than a set of ideas.” This is also evident in the Jacksonian disdain for intellectualism (Kiersey). Had Bush reacted more ideologically and less emotionally, the Iraq debacle may have been averted.

The second subjective issue with Schmidt's argument is that of “armed defense.” Each different grand theory offers a different interpretation of the limitations associated with “armed defense.” Does the “mainstream understanding” of national security allow for first-strike wars? It must not be forgotten that both security and threats to it are conceptualized differently by each individual. For example, the Jeffersonian approach to national security stresses caution in foreign affairs and prefers “the least costly and dangerous methods” of protecting the United States in the dangerous state of globalization (Kiersey). This approach would rather avoid possible conflicts with other nations before they begin. The Wilsonian approach, however, claims that it is the United States' responsibility to bring civilization to less developed parts of the world, and in doing so, we must interact with other nation-states. Under this ideology, the United States is not immune from military threats, therefore, they must attempt to create as many democracies as possible in the world, as democracies are more reliable partners in ascertaining world peace than are tyrannies (Kiersey). The fact that there are such varying opinions on how threats are perceived only further demonstrates the need for a clear definition of “armed defense” in relation to national security.

President Obama's approach to foreign policy is mostly Wilsonian, as he recognizes how necessary it is to engage with other nation-states in pursuit of common goals. Now that the country is deeply embedded in an economic crisis, Hamiltonian ideas are making their way into new policies. This approach to foreign policy stresses the importance of industry and commerce as a way of creating peace (Kiersey). Certainly the new administration is focused on rebuilding the world's faith in American commerce. A Wilsonian approach with a hint of Hamiltonianism is most feasible for national security preservation today. The realist approach to international relations, coupled with the Jacksonian approach to national security, has expired. These emotional responses, inevitably, do not protect the “core values” in relation to human security. More intellectual, resolute analyses must now be made about national security, and, today, the Wilsonian approach is more reasonable than the other three identified by Mead.

Section 2 – Question 2
Neoconservative Ideeologies Damaged United States Foreign Policy

During George W. Bush's presidency, Neoconservative ideologies hijacked a Jacksonian view of national security in the attempt to seek moral vengeance on a major foreign policy actor. This action has had an immensely negative effect on United States foreign policy, as it has damaged the administration both domestically and internationally. Foong Khong lists the administration's biggest international failures as: “The failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq, the US mistreatment of prisoners in Baghdad's Abu Ghraib prison, and the eruption of a vicious civil war in Iraq.” Domestically, “US casualties in the inconclusive Iraq war” have damaged the American public's opinion of the administration (252). Bush surrounded himself with a host of fellow Neoconservatives, whose ideologies guided the hand of the United States government for eight long years. The United States' new administrators, and subsequently the new foreign policy actors, have the responsibility to employ a new grand theory in order to restore dignity to foreign policy.

The origins of Neoconservatism were located by Irving Kristol “among the disillusioned liberal intellecutals of the 1970s” (qtd. 253). The liberals, he explained, were disillusioned due to sharp tilt to the left following the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War. This was when Jacksonian “core values” were questioned, and liberals began refusing to defend themselves regarding traditional values. Neoconservatives like Kristol found this separation from moral values to be dangerous to the political system (253).

Kristol and Robert Kagan classified Neoconservatives as “fervent anti-communists, emphasizing the ideological and moral superiority of democracy, while advocating the maintenance of a strong military” (qtd. 254). Neoconservatives will advocate bigger military budgets even in times of financial hardship just to preserve “prestige and power of the United States military” (254). More than $600 billion has been spent on the war in Iraq thanks to Neoconservative ideologies, however, the United States military is less prestigious than ever before. Both domestically and internationally, the military in Iraq is viewed as an extension of Neoconservativism.

Krisol and Kagan identified four major tenets of Neoconservative foreign policy thought. The first tenet is the Neoconservative desire for moral clarity in the international arena. Neoconservatives believe that “democratic leaders and liberal democracies are good; tyrants and tyrannical regimes are bad” (qtd. 256). Therefore, morality and the interests of the state should be joined with diplomacy, and the United States has a moral responsibility to act against foreign policy actors who threaten either the interests or the morals of the United States. Furthermore, Neoconservatives conclude that the United States, as a moral institution, has the right to pass judgment on foreign nations it considers immoral. The second tenet of Neoconservative ideology is that the United States should “preserve its military preeminence in the post-Cold War world,” capitalizing on a monopoly of power by acting as “a benevolent US hegemony (256). This also relates to the third tenet, which is that the United States “should leverage its military power” to pursue foreign policy goals. Neoconservatives are quick to employ the United States as a prominent international actor because of the fourth tenet, their skepticism about the ability of international law and institutions to bring about world peace (256-7). During Bush's presidency, all of these Neoconservative tenets were applied to foreign policy.

Foong Khong discusses the various enabling “factors” and “events” which lead to the Neoconservatives' rise to preeminence during the past eight years. First, when Bush was elected president, he appointed at least eight fellow Neoconservatives to important positions in this administration. It was at this juncture that Neoconservative political thought moved from the political fringe to the political spotlight (258). Second, 9/11 gave the Bush administration a new lease to use military force in Iraq. Targeting Afghanistan was symbolic to the preservation of moral clarity in the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, and Iraq posed a similar possible threat to United States national security. Third, suspicions regarding WMDs in Iraq were announced, giving the administration further decree to take action. The one per cent doctrine cleared up any insecurities about the invasion; it stated that “even with a one percent chance of a grave threat materialzing, the US should treat that threat as a certainty and act to eliminate it” (261). One final “factor” related to the Neoconservatives' reign is that since the invasion of Iraq, they have seemingly abandoned the idea of reconstruction. They may push for forceful regime change, but they are not concerned with the idea of nation-building (262). This conflicts the Neoconservatives idea that the United States should be a benevolent arbitrator in such moral situations.

The problem with Neoconservatism is the idea of moral clarity. What is moral and in the eyes of whom? Neoconservatives maintain the United States should act as a benevelent hegemon to the world because it has the military reputation and power to do so. However, these core ideologies have been undermined by a failure to succeed in Iraq. Both internationally and domestically, there is a need for a new approach to United States foreign policy. The Bush administration's reign and the failure in Iraq is a crucial testament to the ineffectiveness of Neoconservatism in foreign policy.

Section 3
Book Review: Samantha Power's Chasing the Flame: One Man's Fight to Save the World

Chasing the Flame: One Man's Fight to Save the World by Samantha Power is the biography of Sergio Vieira de Mello, a diplomat and humanitarian whose contradictions and failures were rooted in the institution he so loyally served, the United Nations. Vieira de Mello, who climbed the UN food chain from assistant editor at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in 1969 to Special Representative of the Secretary General in Iraq in 2003, embraced international law and the UN as elements of global justice. He insisted that the only way to bring about lasting global stability is to press countries to play by international UN rules (9). But while Vieria de Mello worked diligently to spread the UN's reach to those in need, the organization's internal contradictions consistently prevented flawless peacekeeping. Power's intention is to flush out these contradictions by telling about Vieira de Mello's experiences. Ironically, Vieria de Mello was killed in a suicide bombing attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003, marking the end of a personal evolution that tracked the UN's achievements and failures (xviii).

Power focuses particularly on the UN's mistakes which were exposed in the genocidal crisis of the mid-1990s. Time and time again, she cites instances where the UN's authority prevented, rather than maintained or created, peacekeeping. A general ethic of strict political neutrality ended up favoring aggressors like the Hutu extremists in Rwanda and the Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo. In 1994, the UN mandated that soldiers in the area were not allowed to use their weapons, even in self-defense. This lead to Hutu militias massacring some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutu (pg. xvi). In 1995, the UN discouraged the use of NATO air power to end the conflict in Bosnia, therefore prolonging the devastation on the ground. Eventually, the Croatian Army and NATO forces attacked the Serbs, and the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian men and boys was halted by the UN bombing of Serbia, proving that some conflicts cannot be solved without resort to power (xvi).

Power claims that Americans today have two principles: 1) Retreat from global engagement altogether. Or 2) Go abroad to stamp out threats in the hopes of achieving full security. By the end of the 1990s, Vieria de Mello had determined that the best route to world peace is a mixture of the two. He had also concluded, by this point, that the UN needed to shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcement as a part of a new global “responsibility to protect.” The 1990s provided foreign policy with some difficult lessons. Of most importance, hard power is sometimes needed to resolve political conflicts. Because, aside from the UN, we do not have international institutions to resolve such conflicts, the UN must be willing to take a hard line with international criminals.

While it is easy to lay blame on the UN for it's peacekeeping failures, we must realize that the nation-states behind the organization fail to supply it with adequate resources, attention and manpower. Today, as the world is watching the Iraq debacle unfold, the idea that strong countries like the US should use their power to defend human rights or promote democracy around the world has become widely debated. Now focused on an overmilitarized foreign policy, we tend to forget the lessons of the 1990s, that sometimes, hard power is necessary to resolve political conflicts. However, until we have a set of international institutions and legislation intact, this type of diplomacy cannot be effectively deployed. Power describes the UN's failures well through Vieira de Mello's biography, and she provides the substance for a healthy debate on the role of international institutions in foreign policy.

Works Cited

Foong Khong, Yuen. “Neoconservativism and the Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. Ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. 252-265.

Kiersey, Nicholas. Ohio University-Chillicothe, Chillicothe, Ohio. March 2009.

Power, Samantha. Chasing the Flame: One Man's Fight to Save the World. New York: Penguin Books, 2008.

Schmidt, Brian C. “The Primacy of National Security.” Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. Ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. 162-164.