For decades, International Relations theories have circulated in a primarily male-dominated arena, and it wasn't until the late 1980s that women began contributing a feminine voice to IR debates. The second wave of feminism had ended and the third was beginning, and women were determined to have their opinions included in IR. The recognition of women in IR, feminists argued, required more than simply adding feminist issues to the mix of preexisting conditions in the international arena. According to Cynthia Weber, feminists “stressed that feminist questions change the very terms in which IR was approached, understood, and studied” (82). This was a challenge for IR scholars who had built their theories around the concept of man, the state and war – the term “man” intended to represent a gender-free individual. However, as feminist issues were applied to IR, it became evident that there were not simply issues relevant to “man,” but issues relevant to men and women separately as well as together.
As feminist views were incorporated into IR, many scholars, like Adam Jones, determined that the feminist agenda was narrowly focused on only issues pertaining to women, and that it blamed men as the primary source of womens' hardships. In regards to war and peace, Jones says, “the plight of embodied women is front and centre throughout, while the attention paid to the male/masculine realm amounts to little more than lip-service” (88). There is no doubt that feminism has received a negative backlash for all of the reasons Jones outlines.
To be sure that men weren't being short-changed by the elevation of women, Jones recommended that the notion of feminism in IR be rebranded to discuss gender in IR, therefore calling attention to masculine as well as feminine issues. Jones introduced the myth, “gender is a variable,” claiming that gender is a characteristic of identity that can be placed as desired or necessary. As gender debates amount to little more than pieces being moved on a chess board, it is easy to believe that gender is a variable that can be placed where necessary. Defining gender as a neutral variable that brings the voices of both sexes to the IR table is a tantalizing option. But is gender something that can be divorced from the way an individual perceives the world? Or is it a constant variable that can be used to manipulate the world?
The 2003 film, Monster, is based on the true story of the United States' first convicted female serial killer, Aileen Wuornos, and pushes Jones' myth to the limit, questioning whether gender is inherent, unavoidable, and a part of our undeniable identity, or if it is a tool that can be used and withdrawn when either gender elects to use that variable to their advantage. Wuornos challenged traditional gender roles at every turn, working as a prostitute, being involved in a lesbian relationship, and eventually morphing into a man-killing “monster.” Wuornos admitted to killing six men between 1989 and 1990, and she was executed for her crimes in 2002. She was unrepentant in her admission of the acts, as if the victims deserved to pay for what she claimed to be a life of male-dominated oppression. The legal system decided that Wuornos had, in fact, used her gender to seek revenge for the injustices she'd felt. As a prostitute, she seduced men into desiring her sexual services, and then, just before she delivered, she murdered them. At first glance, it certainly seems that gender can be a variable. But the film depicts Wuornos as more than just a murderous prostitute. Flashbacks show that Wuornos turned to killing as a result of the constant oppression she'd endured because of her gender since she was a small child. While she may have used her gender to her advantage while seeking murderous justice, she had previously failed to escape the confinement of her gender time and time again. This is what drove Wuornos to her monstrous crimes.
Although the film doesn't attempt to justify Wuornos' actions, it does depict her as a flawed, loving, and hopeful character. It becomes easy to sympathize with her even though her crimes are so outrageous. The film begins with Wuornos' narration as she reminisces about letting boys look at her breasts for money and acceptance. She was raped by a family friend at age 8, and when she told her father about it, he beat her. She was pregnant by the age of 13, and by the time she was old enough to care for herself, all she knew was sex. She kept searching for the right man to take her away from her miserable life, exchanging sexual favors for attention. When the men started refusing her attention and paying her money instead, she accepted prostitution as a way of life. At one point in the film, Wuornos makes up her mind to change her lifestyle, to get a job, and to clean up her act. She is ridiculed for her ignorance at every turn, and even a police officer propositions her for a sex act, telling her, “Once a prostitute, always a prostitute.” Wuornos claimed self-defense in the first murder; she said the man raped and brutalized her beforehand. But while the film generates some sympathy for Wuornos and her unfortunate life, it still depicts the brutality of the murders and the calculating attitude with which she carried them out. By the third murder, she was carefully planning the engagements and keeping newspaper clippings about the murders as mementos.
Monster speaks volumes about what is typical and what is deviant regarding gender roles in modern United States society. First, it proves that a society based on gender and class hierarchies has no sympathy for abused girls who grow up to be prostitutes. The legal system determined Wuornos to be not only guilty but deserving of the death penalty. Second, it reaffirms – and then challenges – the typical roles of dominant males and submissive females. It depicts how males work to keep females “in their place.” Wuornos' story is not typical of every woman's, but it is an extreme case of the male-dominated oppression many women encounter at some point in their lives. When Wuornos finally decided to act on the anger raging within her, she took on a more dominant role, and at last used her gender as a variable, luring men into a deadly trap. Third, the movie joins a long line of films depicting lesbians as dangerous. Wuornos becomes involved with a woman just as she begins her murderous rampage. Her disgust for men prevents her from having sexual relations with them outside of prostitution, so she becomes involved with Selby Wall who teaches her how it feels to be loved and then eventually gives her up for her crimes. But Wuornos is not the strategic, psychological killer that is portrayed in films like Basic Instinct. She kills with a gun, providing some distance between it and her victims, because she knows her physical presence is incapable of creating fear in the men. All of these gender variables which Wuornos embodies are characteristics of her identity, regardless of how deviant they are considered by others. Wuornos knows that no one has experienced what she has, and she doesn't feel guilty about her crimes. If gender is a variable, it is a qualitative and quantitative factor, but Wuornos deviated from typical gender roles so frequently that it would be a difficult variable to examine. While many of Wuornos' characteristics could be considered deviant, the film sheds light on the motivations behind her actions – motivations that certainly invoke sympathy from the audience.
Wuornos' story proves that classifying gender as a variable isn't as simple as Jones and other IR scholars would like it to be. Gender issues are constantly evolving to reflect the change taking place in male and female identities world wide. By calling gender a variable, Jones is attempting to reach a gender-free solution for IR, but because he deems women as incapable of balanced reasoning, his analysis is biased from the beginning. As Weber suggests, IR scholars like Jones “fear that their own privileged perspectives on international politics and their own centralized questions might be displaced – if not replaced – by feminist ones”(90). By calling gender a variable, Jones is attempting to put feminism in its place, making it tow the line alongside masculine issues. He is holding the feminists to the classical standards of international theory, but gender issues today deal with topics classical theory didn't think to recognize. From prostitution to homosexuality to the serial murder of men, Wuornos proved that women could not be held to typical gender roles in today's modern society.
Feminist V. Spike Peterson claims that gender is not a variable, but a world view: “Feminist scholarship, both deconstructive and reconstructive, takes seriously the following two insights: first, that gender is socially constructed, producing subjective identities through which we see and know the world, and second, that the world is pervasively shaped by gendered meanings” (89). This statement suggests that gender is not something that can be removed from the way an individual has been shaped nor from the way they view the world around them. Gender is inherent; it comes with the territory of being reared in a world comprised of engendered social norms. Jones suggests that for the betterment of IR, males and females alike must be able to stand outside of their gender to evaluate the world. Monster proves that this is an impossible feat to accomplish. The film is based on Wuornos' true story, a murderous rampage fueled by her depressing view of the world. A female who had been sexually violated her entire life, Wuornos found it impossible to escape the oppression of her gender. She simply could not divorce a lifetime of experience from the urge to taste justice.
Jones talks about issues affecting primarily men that could be brought to the IR table alongside feminist issues, one of which is the issue of men as victims of murder. In Monster, however, Wuornos' victims are undeveloped and the story is told from her point of view. No case is necessary for the victims; the brutal murders speak for themselves, and Wuornos was both convicted and executed thereafter. If the film weren't based on a true story, though, it is doubtful that the outcome would have been the same. It successfully creates sympathy for Wuornos, and if the circumstances had been different, testimonials on behalf of the victims might have been necessary. If the tables were turned, Jones would have appreciated the opportunity for testimonies to be given against one of the United States' first female serial killers. Neither the prosecution nor the defense in this case could successfully stand outside of their gender to determine Wuornos' guilt or innocence.
Monster puts Jones' theory that gender is a variable to the ultimate test. Wuornos, by finally electing to use her gender to lure men into a deadly revenge scheme, proves that gender can be a variable, but not that it always is. There were many times in her life when she wanted nothing more than to escape the confinement of her gender, but failed in her attempts to do so. Instead, Monster proves that gender is both a world view and a characteristic of one's personal identity, something which cannot be separated from the issues that women are likely to bring to the table during IR debates.
As depicted in the film, Wuornos supported her own death sentence. She lacked remorse regarding the murders and thought death to be the only way to escape her oppression. It is imperative that gender issues like those that Wuornos suffered are not ignored in the political arena. IR scholars like Jones who attempt to keep women in their place are only increasing the negative psychological impact that women endure while trying to find equality. Jones' notion of gender in IR as opposed to narrowly-focused feminism is admirable, especially by those who feel the feminist agenda has, indeed, been too concerned with single-gender issues. However, his arguments beg the question as to whether men feel that they are losing a piece of the proverbial pie to women's social elevation. This power struggle must be abandoned for gender progress to be made in the world. Feminist nor masculine issues can be ignored when proposed in IR. Instead, IR scholars must be willing to take on a simultaneous feminine and masculine world view, as gender is not a variable, but instead a component of the identities of the individuals composing the world as we know it.
Works Cited
Monster. Dir. Patty Jenkins. Perf. Charlize Theron, Christina Ricci. 2003. DVD. Media 8 Entertainment, 2004.
Weber, Cynthia.International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005.
Showing posts with label pols. Show all posts
Showing posts with label pols. Show all posts
Monday, August 3, 2009
Saturday, May 30, 2009
Book Review: How Does It Feel To Be A Problem? Being Young and Arab In America
In How Does It Feel To Be A Problem? Being Young and Arab In America, author Moustafa Bayoumi tells the stories of seven young Arab and Muslim Americans who he claims to be victims of racial profiling and discrimination resulting from the American government's efforts to defeat the “war on terror.” He begins his book by citing American civil rights activist W.E.B. Du Bois, who wrote The Souls of Black Folk in 1903 in an attempt to expose readers to black culture, thereby bridging the gap between African-American minorities and Americans who viewed them as a problem. Bayoumi's goal, like Du Bois', is to elaborate not only the culture of Arab and Muslim Americans, but to, with their experiences, paint a picture of how difficult it is to be America's newest minority. Bayoumi explains that while the American creed of fairness is “supposed to mean that we ought to be judged not by our religion, gender, color, or country of origin, but simply by the content of our individual characters ... The terrorist attacks, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the explosion of political violence around the world have put that dream in jeopardy for American Arabs and Muslims” (3).
Profiled in the book are young Arab-Americans from Brooklyn who have fought against the American system to find a bit of equality for themselves and their families. From Rasha, whose family was profiled and imprisoned as suspected terrorists, to Sami, who worked his way up the military ladder to fight against his own people in Iraq, to Yasmin and Omar, who worked to find equality for Arabs and Muslims in the school and workplace, Bayoumi writes engaging pieces that highlight the struggles of these people. Furthermore, the book details how many of these individuals were lead to America either by being driven out of their own country or to capitalize on the country's motto of “the land of opportunity.” Unfortunately for these individuals, they seek opportunity in America at a time when the country is on the attack against anyone vaguely similar to those terrorists who perpetrated the events of 9/11. As Bayoumi explains, “While it could be said that profiling other groups was officially un-American, profiling Arabs and Muslims made good national security sense” (4). This profiling has created numerous problems for young Arabs and Muslims in America. Their lives are now dictated by national security, which means their jobs and careers become unstable, and they are on the constant defense of their ethnicity.
In the Afterword, Bayoumi blames America for being imperialistic, for attempting to control the Middle East and its people for its own financial gain. He cautions against this, stating that “political theorists of empire have repeatedly cautioned that the consequences of imperialism can reach far beyond the colony” (268). Bayoumi is unmistakably Neomarxist in his assessment of the situation. He views America not as a benevolent hegemony to the world, but as an imperial power determined to create a monopoly on the world. 9/11 gave America a reason to justify military operations in the Middle East, as well as a reason to completely overhaul federal law enforcement to prevent further terrorism within America's borders. Arab and Muslim Americans have become Bayoumi's proletariats, as the American government has been determined to keep their presence and importance in the country minimal. While many examinations of Neomarxism (like Michael Hardt and Antionio Negri's Empire) are difficult to interpret, Bayoumi's book is a good case study for the theory of empire. It is the theory of empire in action. His book is certainly positioned against the American theme of Manifest Destiny, and he uses poignant examples to explain how this type of imperialism is dangerous to human rights worldwide. “What we are currently livng through,” Bayoumi explains, “Is the slow creep of imperial high-handedness into the rest of American society, performed in the name of national security and facilitated through the growth of racist policies”( 269). The only way to retaliate against the empire is through resistance, he claims, and the efforts of the young Arabs and Muslims portrayed in his book are simply the first step in the right direction.
Work Cited
Bayoumi, Moustafa. How Does It Feel To Be a Problem? Being Young and Arab In America. New York: The Penguin Press, 2008.
Profiled in the book are young Arab-Americans from Brooklyn who have fought against the American system to find a bit of equality for themselves and their families. From Rasha, whose family was profiled and imprisoned as suspected terrorists, to Sami, who worked his way up the military ladder to fight against his own people in Iraq, to Yasmin and Omar, who worked to find equality for Arabs and Muslims in the school and workplace, Bayoumi writes engaging pieces that highlight the struggles of these people. Furthermore, the book details how many of these individuals were lead to America either by being driven out of their own country or to capitalize on the country's motto of “the land of opportunity.” Unfortunately for these individuals, they seek opportunity in America at a time when the country is on the attack against anyone vaguely similar to those terrorists who perpetrated the events of 9/11. As Bayoumi explains, “While it could be said that profiling other groups was officially un-American, profiling Arabs and Muslims made good national security sense” (4). This profiling has created numerous problems for young Arabs and Muslims in America. Their lives are now dictated by national security, which means their jobs and careers become unstable, and they are on the constant defense of their ethnicity.
In the Afterword, Bayoumi blames America for being imperialistic, for attempting to control the Middle East and its people for its own financial gain. He cautions against this, stating that “political theorists of empire have repeatedly cautioned that the consequences of imperialism can reach far beyond the colony” (268). Bayoumi is unmistakably Neomarxist in his assessment of the situation. He views America not as a benevolent hegemony to the world, but as an imperial power determined to create a monopoly on the world. 9/11 gave America a reason to justify military operations in the Middle East, as well as a reason to completely overhaul federal law enforcement to prevent further terrorism within America's borders. Arab and Muslim Americans have become Bayoumi's proletariats, as the American government has been determined to keep their presence and importance in the country minimal. While many examinations of Neomarxism (like Michael Hardt and Antionio Negri's Empire) are difficult to interpret, Bayoumi's book is a good case study for the theory of empire. It is the theory of empire in action. His book is certainly positioned against the American theme of Manifest Destiny, and he uses poignant examples to explain how this type of imperialism is dangerous to human rights worldwide. “What we are currently livng through,” Bayoumi explains, “Is the slow creep of imperial high-handedness into the rest of American society, performed in the name of national security and facilitated through the growth of racist policies”( 269). The only way to retaliate against the empire is through resistance, he claims, and the efforts of the young Arabs and Muslims portrayed in his book are simply the first step in the right direction.
Work Cited
Bayoumi, Moustafa. How Does It Feel To Be a Problem? Being Young and Arab In America. New York: The Penguin Press, 2008.
Journal: Gender and Fatal Attraction
Cynthia Weber's assessment of gender in International Relations is my favorite in her book so far. She makes a clear, concise argument against Adam Jones' essay “Does 'Gender' Make the World Go Round? Feminist Critiques of International Relations” (82) In this piece, Jones explains how feminist agendas have detracted from their efforts to attain true equality, and that by changing terms from “feminism” to “gender,” men will not be short-changed by the demands of equality by women. Jones makes the claim that “gender is a variable” in IR, and that the only way to have a balance of power is if masculine concerns are addressed as well as feminine issues (83). He claims that “feminists' use of the gender variable has been biased from the start against men and masculinity,” and that “feminism is unbalanced, even irrational” (88). By analyzing the gender relationships in the film Fatal Attraction, Weber takes on Jones' gender myth in an attempt to determine if the variable of gender is being placed purposefully, or if gender is a worldview, as feminist V. Spike Peterson claims (89). If gender is a tool through which we see the world, it certainly cannot be a variable to be moved around like a chess piece.
I, like Weber, have no sympathy for Dan, the movie's protagonist. From the onset of his relationship with Alex, he manipulates both her gender and his own for sexual gratification. He shows her moments of weakness (the comment about men's insecurities muttered at the bar upon their first meeting and his story about Madame Butterfly), and constantly chalks up her moments of weakness as irrational. Alex is certainly a young woman plagued by mental issues. Sure, she agreed upon a verbal contract for a one-night stand, but Dan broke that contract by staying with her the entire weekend. While her actions are extreme, they remind me of my early 20s, when I was awash with the emotionalism that comes to most women at that point in their lives. Alex had not been used the first night; she agreed to that. However, as Dan weakens beneath her pleas, he begins to give their relationship meaning beyond their contractual agreement. Throughout the movie, his reactions to her actions confused me. “Who has the power here?” I kept asking myself. As Weber explains, Dan seems to do just fine when he can keep Alex within the confines of “normal” femininity, but when she demands to be treated fairly, he has problems. The entire film seemed like a chess game, with each player counteracting the other's movements. The biggest problem, however, is Dan's inability to turn away from Alex for good. If he were to successfully reject her, she would surely call his wife and tell her about the affair. So, to keep her cool, Dan makes unmistakably bad moves, like moving in for a final hug when all the woman asked for was a handshake. Time and time again, Dan's actions lead Alex on a little further, making her a little less rational. It must be hard for her, after all, having been used for the weekend, knocked up, and tossed aside. I cannot blame her for craving the family life that Dan already has. Of course, her actions go too far, but that could've been countered by an earlier confession of adultery by Dan.
In the final section of Weber's gender chapter, she parallels the threat Alex brings to Dan's normal family with the threat feminists bring to traditional IR. She explains that feminism challenges the “norms” of IR just like Alex challenged the “norms” of Dan's family situation. When looked at this way, gender doesn't seem to be a variable at all. If Dan could've kept Alex in check throughout, then maybe gender could be considered a variable. However, gender is the view through which all of these characters see their world. Weber makes some very valid points against Jones' argument, although I agree with his re-branding of “feminism” and use of the term “gender.” If IR theory is to recognize the feminist agenda, it must do so through a gendered worldview where feminine and masculine concerns can both be addressed. Jones' argument, however, is just like the chess game Dan and Alex were involved in. It seems just when the female side of the gendered conversation speaks up, the male side must reply. To me, this seems a power struggle that could go on forever, or at least until there are more women present in IR. I don't like to call myself a feminist, but I do have a bitter edge, like Weber, when women try to make their claim for equality (equality among both sexes, not just power handed to women on a silver platter), and men respond with undeniable fear that their piece of the pie is being taken away.
Work Cited
Weber, Cynthia. International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005.
I, like Weber, have no sympathy for Dan, the movie's protagonist. From the onset of his relationship with Alex, he manipulates both her gender and his own for sexual gratification. He shows her moments of weakness (the comment about men's insecurities muttered at the bar upon their first meeting and his story about Madame Butterfly), and constantly chalks up her moments of weakness as irrational. Alex is certainly a young woman plagued by mental issues. Sure, she agreed upon a verbal contract for a one-night stand, but Dan broke that contract by staying with her the entire weekend. While her actions are extreme, they remind me of my early 20s, when I was awash with the emotionalism that comes to most women at that point in their lives. Alex had not been used the first night; she agreed to that. However, as Dan weakens beneath her pleas, he begins to give their relationship meaning beyond their contractual agreement. Throughout the movie, his reactions to her actions confused me. “Who has the power here?” I kept asking myself. As Weber explains, Dan seems to do just fine when he can keep Alex within the confines of “normal” femininity, but when she demands to be treated fairly, he has problems. The entire film seemed like a chess game, with each player counteracting the other's movements. The biggest problem, however, is Dan's inability to turn away from Alex for good. If he were to successfully reject her, she would surely call his wife and tell her about the affair. So, to keep her cool, Dan makes unmistakably bad moves, like moving in for a final hug when all the woman asked for was a handshake. Time and time again, Dan's actions lead Alex on a little further, making her a little less rational. It must be hard for her, after all, having been used for the weekend, knocked up, and tossed aside. I cannot blame her for craving the family life that Dan already has. Of course, her actions go too far, but that could've been countered by an earlier confession of adultery by Dan.
In the final section of Weber's gender chapter, she parallels the threat Alex brings to Dan's normal family with the threat feminists bring to traditional IR. She explains that feminism challenges the “norms” of IR just like Alex challenged the “norms” of Dan's family situation. When looked at this way, gender doesn't seem to be a variable at all. If Dan could've kept Alex in check throughout, then maybe gender could be considered a variable. However, gender is the view through which all of these characters see their world. Weber makes some very valid points against Jones' argument, although I agree with his re-branding of “feminism” and use of the term “gender.” If IR theory is to recognize the feminist agenda, it must do so through a gendered worldview where feminine and masculine concerns can both be addressed. Jones' argument, however, is just like the chess game Dan and Alex were involved in. It seems just when the female side of the gendered conversation speaks up, the male side must reply. To me, this seems a power struggle that could go on forever, or at least until there are more women present in IR. I don't like to call myself a feminist, but I do have a bitter edge, like Weber, when women try to make their claim for equality (equality among both sexes, not just power handed to women on a silver platter), and men respond with undeniable fear that their piece of the pie is being taken away.
Work Cited
Weber, Cynthia. International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005.
Journal: Constructivism and Wag the Dog
In chapter four, Cynthia Weber tackles the myth behind Constructivism (introduced by Alexander Wendt in 1992), which declares that “anarchy is what states make of it,” and that anarchy can either be cooperative or conflictual depending upon the states' identities and interests (60). She outlines Wendt's definition of Constructivism, explaining that Wendt put much emphasis on the question, “who is the author of international anarchy?” Weber argues that a more important question is how social practice shapes us to believe that there even is an author of international anarchy. Through the film Wag the Dog, she demonstrates how a seduced public tends to “reify” their world, meaning that they accept a socially constructed world as one that already exists as is; social shaping is “out-of-sight, out-of-mind.” This is particularly unsettling, because as Weber explains, “...this reification of authorship is terribly clever because there is no guarantee practices can reliably be traced to authors” (68).
Wag the Dog successfully portrays how easily major political events can be “produced,” and how seducing this production is to the public. It also shows that individual human beings are responsible for these manipulations, even though “the state” receives the credit for its actions. Constructivism allows for the production of international anarchy by states, but it fails to allow us to examine the authors behind the states' decisions. Weber blames this shortcoming on the lack of emphasis on state practice. As it is, Constructivism accepts anarchy as a structure that exists regardless of a state's reaction to it, just like Realism. Constructivism also tries to make a place for the behavior of the state, determining that it has the choice to either react cooperatively or conflictually. Wendt agreed that anarchy is a structural principle that makes states behave in a competitive, self-help manner, but thought that if practice amongst states could be restored, then the structure of anarchy could be avoided. By this, he meant that if we can recognize that our processes result from our social interactions, then we might be able to alter our practices - identities, interests, and institutions - and in turn, how we approach anarchical situations. Weber concludes that even this route misses the point. Constructivism still holds the state accountable as the author of international anarchy, therefore removing any accountability from the individual human beings whom are “wagging the dog.” Finger-pointing aside, this theory doesn't even explain how practices allow us to accept that there is an unknown author. Without understanding how, change to the Constructivist perspective is limited. States cannot be expected to change their policies without first changing (or even recognizing) their practices.
Wag the Dog emphasizes how the media contributes to this “seduction” and “reification.” Identities, interests and institutions are constructed and reconstructed before the public's eye through the media. The public tends to “reify” the world based on what they see on television with their own eyes. The seduction of “seeing is believing” takes hold of mainstream America even though we know the entire farce has been produced. Most importantly, however, the film focuses on the producer and his invisibility. For any production to be deemed successful, its producer must remain unknown and uncredited. “For if we knew about all the special effects and all the dramas behind the drama, we would lose interest in the drama itself,” says Weber (73). Because the public craves this form of dramatic entertainment, I am unconvinced that it will be willing to give up its reification of the world in order to learn who the true producers are. At the same time, Constructivism teases the public by telling it that states can be their own authors of international anarchy, but it stops short of holding the actual individual decision-makers accountable. I agree with Weber's assessment of the myth, which determines that the wording is misleading. If “anarchy is what states make of it,” then who is doing the interpreting?
Work Cited
Weber, Cynthia. International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005.
Wag the Dog successfully portrays how easily major political events can be “produced,” and how seducing this production is to the public. It also shows that individual human beings are responsible for these manipulations, even though “the state” receives the credit for its actions. Constructivism allows for the production of international anarchy by states, but it fails to allow us to examine the authors behind the states' decisions. Weber blames this shortcoming on the lack of emphasis on state practice. As it is, Constructivism accepts anarchy as a structure that exists regardless of a state's reaction to it, just like Realism. Constructivism also tries to make a place for the behavior of the state, determining that it has the choice to either react cooperatively or conflictually. Wendt agreed that anarchy is a structural principle that makes states behave in a competitive, self-help manner, but thought that if practice amongst states could be restored, then the structure of anarchy could be avoided. By this, he meant that if we can recognize that our processes result from our social interactions, then we might be able to alter our practices - identities, interests, and institutions - and in turn, how we approach anarchical situations. Weber concludes that even this route misses the point. Constructivism still holds the state accountable as the author of international anarchy, therefore removing any accountability from the individual human beings whom are “wagging the dog.” Finger-pointing aside, this theory doesn't even explain how practices allow us to accept that there is an unknown author. Without understanding how, change to the Constructivist perspective is limited. States cannot be expected to change their policies without first changing (or even recognizing) their practices.
Wag the Dog emphasizes how the media contributes to this “seduction” and “reification.” Identities, interests and institutions are constructed and reconstructed before the public's eye through the media. The public tends to “reify” the world based on what they see on television with their own eyes. The seduction of “seeing is believing” takes hold of mainstream America even though we know the entire farce has been produced. Most importantly, however, the film focuses on the producer and his invisibility. For any production to be deemed successful, its producer must remain unknown and uncredited. “For if we knew about all the special effects and all the dramas behind the drama, we would lose interest in the drama itself,” says Weber (73). Because the public craves this form of dramatic entertainment, I am unconvinced that it will be willing to give up its reification of the world in order to learn who the true producers are. At the same time, Constructivism teases the public by telling it that states can be their own authors of international anarchy, but it stops short of holding the actual individual decision-makers accountable. I agree with Weber's assessment of the myth, which determines that the wording is misleading. If “anarchy is what states make of it,” then who is doing the interpreting?
Work Cited
Weber, Cynthia. International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005.
Journal: Idealism and Independence Day
In Chapter 3, by analyzing the film Independence Day, Cynthia Weber deconstructs the idealistic myth that “there is an international society.” This statement, derived from the studies of Charles Kegley, assumes that anarchy can be replaced by the collective cooperation of community, and that in a world where “anarchy is the permissive cause of war,” social networks within and beyond a state's borders are the surest route to international security (39). Through her discussion of the film, Weber determines that the theory “there is an international society” may not hold much weight, because, as in the film, all states within the international society do not always participate in making decisions for the greater good. This action is neither collective nor cooperative. In Independence Day, the US and its president operated as the sole orderer, making decisions for all of Mankind, not just for the safety of its own country. Weber claims that, in this instance, the US domestic society has been extended internationally because it is a superpower with the ability to serve as a hegemon to the world (55). Therefore, there is no “international society.”
Kegley's three images of political analysis are similar to Waltz's – they are located at the individual, state and international level. However, Kegley is not focused on the presence of anarchy at the international level (41). Instead, he sees the potential for conflict at all levels, and claims that the individual level is from where good ideas come. Good humans with good ideas can certainly breed a successful domestic society within a democracy, which can overflow into the international arena. However, not all states are democratic. As Weber explains, many nation-states are autocratic, and their rulers might not be “good” people. These dictatorial leaders ignore the good ideas of their good subjects, and therefore, anarchy is always possible in international relations (44).
The theory “there is an international society” is rooted in the fact that humans are social creatures who thrive on communication with one another. Idealism is founded upon the notion that humans are inherently good, and that they are willing to work cooperatively in order to achieve a common goal. Much attention is paid to the themes of communication and good intents in Independence Day. First of all, the importance of pure communication is stressed. The president represents corrupt communication, and it isn't until he is engaged in a telepathic connection with an alien that he determines their intents are ill and that he can make a decision to react against the intruders. He was unable to do so until then, because, like a true idealist, he thought of the aliens as inherently good and possibly capable of moral progression. When he does choose to “Nuke the bastards,” the signal is sent to military worldwide through Morse Code, one of the simplest, purest, most universal forms of communication available.
Weber's discussion of idealism leads her to, once again, point out the missing element from the myth she's deconstructing: fear (53). When analyzing the myth, “anarchy is the permissive cause of war,” Weber determines that fear is the one element missing from Waltz's work. Again, with the myth, “there is an international society,” Weber finds the need for fear in the equation. If an international society does exist, and states elect to act beyond their own self-interests to benefit the world, it exists because fear in an underlying factor. For example, when the British soldiers in Independence Day receive a Morse Code message from the US preparing them for a counter-offensive on the aliens, one says, “It's about bloody time” (54). Because they fear their demise, these men seem grateful for the US's efforts to protect the world. The film projects the US as the savior of the world, which isn't too far-fetched considering the hegemony our nation has created world-wide. However, this still does not support the theory of an international society because not all nations are represented in the retaliation. The US made the decision, the US gave the orders, and the US will get the credit. Fear allows the US to capitalize on the opportunity to save the world. Without it, the US would not be quite as welcome to use its power internationally. But when the world is in danger, the power with the most resources will certainly be welcomed to the table.
Work Cited
Weber, Cynthia.International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005.
Kegley's three images of political analysis are similar to Waltz's – they are located at the individual, state and international level. However, Kegley is not focused on the presence of anarchy at the international level (41). Instead, he sees the potential for conflict at all levels, and claims that the individual level is from where good ideas come. Good humans with good ideas can certainly breed a successful domestic society within a democracy, which can overflow into the international arena. However, not all states are democratic. As Weber explains, many nation-states are autocratic, and their rulers might not be “good” people. These dictatorial leaders ignore the good ideas of their good subjects, and therefore, anarchy is always possible in international relations (44).
The theory “there is an international society” is rooted in the fact that humans are social creatures who thrive on communication with one another. Idealism is founded upon the notion that humans are inherently good, and that they are willing to work cooperatively in order to achieve a common goal. Much attention is paid to the themes of communication and good intents in Independence Day. First of all, the importance of pure communication is stressed. The president represents corrupt communication, and it isn't until he is engaged in a telepathic connection with an alien that he determines their intents are ill and that he can make a decision to react against the intruders. He was unable to do so until then, because, like a true idealist, he thought of the aliens as inherently good and possibly capable of moral progression. When he does choose to “Nuke the bastards,” the signal is sent to military worldwide through Morse Code, one of the simplest, purest, most universal forms of communication available.
Weber's discussion of idealism leads her to, once again, point out the missing element from the myth she's deconstructing: fear (53). When analyzing the myth, “anarchy is the permissive cause of war,” Weber determines that fear is the one element missing from Waltz's work. Again, with the myth, “there is an international society,” Weber finds the need for fear in the equation. If an international society does exist, and states elect to act beyond their own self-interests to benefit the world, it exists because fear in an underlying factor. For example, when the British soldiers in Independence Day receive a Morse Code message from the US preparing them for a counter-offensive on the aliens, one says, “It's about bloody time” (54). Because they fear their demise, these men seem grateful for the US's efforts to protect the world. The film projects the US as the savior of the world, which isn't too far-fetched considering the hegemony our nation has created world-wide. However, this still does not support the theory of an international society because not all nations are represented in the retaliation. The US made the decision, the US gave the orders, and the US will get the credit. Fear allows the US to capitalize on the opportunity to save the world. Without it, the US would not be quite as welcome to use its power internationally. But when the world is in danger, the power with the most resources will certainly be welcomed to the table.
Work Cited
Weber, Cynthia.International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005.
Journal: Realism and Lord of the Flies
In Chapter 2, Cynthia Weber sets out to deconstruct Kenneth Waltz's myth “international anarchy is the permissive cause of war” (14). Waltz examines a three-part system when trying to explain why wars occur. This system begins with the individual, proceeds to the state, and concludes with the international system. In Man, the State, and War, Waltz argues that anarchy creates war, focusing on individual human nature and the likelihood for men to “behave badly.” Men “behaving badly,” of course, leads to insecure social organizations, therefore introducing anarchy within a sovereignty. However, in his later discourse, Theory of International Politics,Waltz extends his myth of anarchy to the international arena (16). Weber is quick to point out one element missing from Waltz's claim: fear. Through her analysis of the film The Lord of the Flies, Weber demonstrates that fear is a necessary element leading to anarchy.
Anarchy is established the moment the boys crash on the island. No adults are present, and the boys act quickly to conform to a more hierarchical system that they're familiar with. The first order of business is to elect leaders, and Jack and Ralph are chosen to represent the others. Next, the boys decide that, since they are Englishmen, they should create and follow rules. “After all, we're not savages,” one of the boys says. A conch shell found on the beach becomes the symbol for law and order, as only he who holds the conch is permitted to speak. Finally, the boys begin to organize themselves into groups. Thus far, the boys have reacted to anarchy very characteristically, trying to make sense of the illogical. Their human nature initially reminds them that it is in their best interest to work together. However, as time passes and the boys lose hope for rescue, Jack's intentions change, and he turns his mode of action from rescue to survival. When this breakdown of unity occurs, it is accompanied by a new element, the element of fear.
As Jack's team now focuses on hunting boar and finding sustenance for survival, Ralph and Piggy in particular are ostracized for focusing on waiting for rescue. A deep divide occurs between the two factions when Jack's team is out killing a boar in the jungle as a plane flies overhead on the beach. Jack's boys, caught up in the killing, let the signal fire go out, probably preventing the plane from seeing the stranded boys. A whole host of negative emotions – anger, dissent, blame, failure – flood Ralph and it is evident that the two groups are no longer working toward a common goal. It is at this point in the movie when fear rears its ugly head. While out killing, Jack's boys claim to see a beast. This new threat weakens any chance of the group working together. Once fear is introduced, the boys revert to what Waltz talks about first, man's selfish, and sometimes “bad” behaviors.
Jack is representative of your typical megalomaniac, who clearly abuses the power bestowed upon him. He throws bananas at Ralph and Piggy as the others eat boar; he takes Piggy's glasses by force, a very war-like maneuver; and he discredits the rules by ignoring the conch. Worst of all, he stands back as one of his boys pushes a rock over, killing Piggy, the voice of reason in the tale. By this point, anarchy has become fully-actualized, and the boys seem to have forgotten their initial intentions – to get rescued. Jack has taken on the position as a tribal leader, and he now seems to hold all of the power, as Ralph has retreated into the jungle since he is outnumbered.
Anarchy quickly gives way to the hierarchy the boys were previously accustomed to when a Naval officer appears on the beach with a boat, ready to rescue the boys. The camera pans to the faces of both Jack and Ralph. Jack appears quite defeated, and Ralph offers a sly smile. Ralph promoted working together more than anyone, and in the end, he was all alone. However, he managed to survive as easily as did Jack and his boys. Regardless of the outcome, it is evident that fear played a major part in the anarchy which abounded on the island. Waltz states that “anarchy is the permissive cause of war,” but as Weber claims, “anarchy alone is insufficient to cause or even allow for conflict. Anarchy requires fear to differentiate the behavior of those acting within it from their behavior within anarchy” (31).
Work Cited
Weber, Cynthia.International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005.
Sunday, May 10, 2009
Constructivism and the Threat of Change in Deadwood
Change ain't lookin' for friends. Change calls the tune we dance to.
- Al Swearengen, Deadwood
The International Relations theory of Constructivism employs the myth, “anarchy is what states make of it,” suggesting that anarchy exists, and that states can elect to be either cooperative or conflictual in its presence (Weber 60). It also examines global change and our reaction to it, as well as the processes of social interaction. Realism focuses on the existence of anarchy amongst states, and Idealism highlights the possibility of avoiding it, but only Constructivism implements change and social process, which are necessary elements to analyze when determining how a state will react in the presence of anarchy. In his 1992 essay, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” Alexander Wendt asks, “Who is the author of international anarchy?” (Weber 61) In other words, if a state elects to participate in international anarchy, exactly who can be held responsible for such a decision? It might seem reasonable to hold a state's leading actors accountable, but as K. M. Fierke reminds us, “It is not that actors are totally free to choose their circumstances, but rather that they make choices in the process of interacting with others, and, as a result, bring historically, culturally, and politically distinct 'realities' into being” (168-169).
David Milch's HBO television series Deadwood exhibits just how important the themes of change and social process are in the face of anarchy. Set in the 1870s in the ungoverned, unclaimed, lawless camp of Deadwood, which had not yet been annexed into the Dakota Territory, the series semi-historically portrays the survival of the camp's inhabitants in the face of change. The show begins just six moths after the founding of the camp, and while many want to make their home in Deadwood close to its rich gold mines, few find the strength to hold their own in the face of its brutality. The first season supports the foundational principle set forth by Realism, that “anarchy is the permissive cause of war” (Weber 14). The purpose of the first season is to describe the lawlessness of the camp and to show that, without annexation, Deadwood is indeed an anarchical place to live. The only man willing to take on the responsibility of watching over the camp's security is Al Swearengen, the owner of the local Gem Saloon, a bar and brothel. In season one, he is challenged by a new Deadwood resident, Seth Bullock, a former Montana sheriff who wants to bring order to the camp. By the end of the season, Swearengen concedes to share the power with Bullock, and both men are considered the camp's watchdogs.
Season two briefly plays on Idealism's anarchy myth, which states that “there is an international society” (Weber 38). This myth suggests that, despite anarchy, states can overcome their differences for the greater good. Throughout the season, Deadwood begins to thrive. Bullock has become the new sheriff with a new deputy on his side, and some order has come to a once lawless society. A new hardware store, telegraph, and brothel arrive on the scene. Alma Garret, the widow of a gold claim seeker, has opened a bank. Deadwood is awaiting annexation into the Dakota Territory, and is preparing to hold elections. Business is booming in the camp, but change is on the horizon. This change, and the camp's reaction to it, will determine its future. It as at this point in the series when Constructivism comes into play. Through competitive, self-help behavior, members of the camp, as well as the camp's impending enemy, will construct realities that will best enable them to survive.
Residents are optimistic about the camp's annexation, until George Hearst, a successful California businessman and prospector, expresses interest in the camp's riches, threatening the Deadwood way of life. The threat of Hearst's presence in Deadwood comes before he physically arrives. Rumors of this prospector's interests make it into the camp ahead of him, creating a fearful curiosity amongst the residents. Near the end of season two, before we have seen the elusive Hearst, he sends a geologist, Francis Wolcott, to examine the camp's gold supply. Soon after his arrival, he murders three prostitutes at the new brothel, encouraging its owner, Joanie Stubbs, to send her remaining prostitutes out of Deadwood. Soon after, Hearst has a load of Chinese prostitutes hauled in to the camp. When they're overseer, Mr. Lee, burns the bodies of dead, malnourished prostitutes in the streets of Deadwood's Chinatown, a fellow Chinaman, Mr. Wu, who has operated in Deadwood for some time now, enlists Swearengen to help him end the atrocity. Wendt explains that “prior to social interaction, there is no such thing as a social threat,” and that “it is identities that produce collective meaning like social threats” (Weber 66). Although there has been no social interaction between Hearst and the camp's residents, those in his employ and their actions give him an identity, which, after these initial incidents, certainly seems threatening. In an act of retaliation and defense, Swearengen and Wu take back the reigns of this new reality by enacting vengeance on Lee, sneakily slitting his throat while he sleeps in Chinatown. This scheme is devised by Swearengen, who will soon become engaged in a series of reality reconstructions through the ordeal with Hearst.
Season two ends with Hearst's physical arrival in Deadwood. He makes it known that he is “only interested in the color,” meaning he wants the gold and nothing more. He is a ruggedly individualistic man who cares for social interaction with none other than his “nigger cook,” who takes care of him. His carelessness for the well-being of others is soon exhibited when he begins to stage the murders of his own miners, who have been trying to form a union. One such murder takes place in The Gem Saloon, Swearengen's business. Not only does Hearst wish to send a message to his “unruly” miners, he wants to send a message to the camp's highest authority, letting him know exactly how he does business (what he “makes of” anarchy) and who Swearengen is dealing with. This production unfolds before the public's eye, as most of these exchanges of constructed realities do occur in Deadwood. Both Swearengen and Hearst begin producing their reactions to one another's maneuvers in broad daylight. Swearengen is intent on banding the camp together against Hearst, and Hearst is intent on showing Deadwood his true nature, and his unyielding confidence strikes fear in the hearts of Deadwood's residents.
In an attempt to reassert his position in the camp, and out of anger at the murder in his saloon, Swearengen cancels the upcoming political debates. It becomes clear that Swearengen is no longer the camp's main decision-maker when Hearst punishes his decision by having his henchman, Captain Turner, restrain Swearengen while he cuts off one of his fingers. Hearst also makes it clear that he wants Swearengen to help him buy the banker Garret's gold claim. This display of force only gives Swearengen's henchman, Dan Dority, the desire to retaliate by fighting Captain Turner. In a long, drawn-out, bloody battle in the main fairway in Deadwood, and just before he is almost drowned in a puddle by Turner, Dority gouges out one of Turner's eyes and finally beats him to death with a club. Swearengen later finds out that Hearst instructed Turner to make the fight last as long as possible, even if at some point he had the upper hand. He is disillusioned in his attempt to retaliate against Hearst once more, never quite prepared for what he has to return. Through this public brawl, Hearst has shown that the streets of Deadwood will be brutal as long as his presence exists. “Anarchy is what states make of it,” and Hearst certainly takes advantage of the lawlessness in the camp.
After Hearst brings a militia of henchmen to Deadwood, Swearengen calls a meeting among the camp's elders to decide what action to take. The group decides to publish a letter, written by Bullock to one of Hearst's miner's families, subtly highlighting Hearst's foul nature. Their hope is that those outside of the camp, but still within the territorial jurisdiction, will form an opinion about Hearst and, in turn, vote for Bullock in the upcoming election. A strong arm will be needed to handle Hearst, after all, and Bullock's opponent, Harry Manning, is a meek and mild man who likely couldn't stand up to the challenge. The result? A.W. Merrick, the editor of The Deadwood Pioneer, is beaten by one of Hearst's men for his decision to publish the letter.
Hearst shows that he means business when he has Garret shot at as she walks down the Deadwood fairway to open the bank one morning. This is an obvious attempt to scare her into selling her claim, and to inspire others to encourage her to sell. Swearengen takes her into The Gem Saloon and watches out for her until he can devise a retaliation. Before the end of the day, members of the town unite to make a protective path for Garret to proceed with her walk to the bank. In the meanwhile, Hearst has Garret's husband shot and killed. When she learns this news, she decides to sell her claim to avoid further bloodshed. “Anarchy is what states make of it,” and even if it means concession, Garret is not willing to be a producer of war.
The final illusion between Swearengen and Hearst occurs when one of Swearengen's prostitutes, Trixie, opens Hearst's hotel room door, shoots him in the chest, and runs, leaving him for dead. However, the shot was not fatal and Hearst returns to Swearengen, demanding Trixie's death in return. Since Swearengen holds Trixie dear to his heart, he murders Jen, a less-worthy prostitute, in hopes of passing off her body as Trixie's to Hearst. As soon as Hearst is fooled by the switch, he announces his plans to leave Deadwood, putting another local brother owner, Cy Tolliver, in control of his mining affairs in the camp. As the third and final season of the show draws to a close, Swearengen and Wu put together an army to battle Hearst's milita, and Bullock receives news that Hearst may have cost him the election by bribing people outside of the camp to vote against him. The show ends with both parties on the brink of war, with the newly-appointed Tolliver at the helm. Tolliver is a long-time Deadwood resident who was forced into working for Hearst earlier in the season. The final scene shows Tolliver pointing a gun towards Hearst, who is walking away from the disruption he caused, but he is unable to pull the trigger. One wonders what Tolliver will “make of” this anarchy.
Deadwood reminds us that even if the authors of anarchy can be traced, there are no international institutions to hold them accountable. Most all of the actions and reactions that take place between Swearengen and Hearst take place in broad daylight, in front of the Deadwood public. The actors, in this instance, are well-known. But, still, Deadwood is a lawless place where anarchy resides, just like the international territory that sovereign nation-states encounter. Even if Swearengen and Hearst are to blame for these war crimes, who will hold them accountable? Perhaps after Deadwood's annexation, and stipulations for law and order are set, justice can be served. But even then one can argue whether or not Swearengen and other Deadwood residents have more jurisdiction in the ungoverned territory than does Hearst, who is just trying to make a living like everyone else. How are one's interests more valued than another's? Weber talks about focusing on the social practices within a state, which, in turn, determine how its actors will behave in the face of anarchy. If Swearengen's state is one that elects to be cooperative, and Hearst's state is one that chooses to be conflictual, what third party decides if those choices are reasonable or not? In International Relations, there is no arbitrator who decides who is right or wrong for choosing to declare to war. Even when Hearst's actions are clearly immoral, Swearengen's reactions are still questionable. But as Wendt explains, “Self-help and power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of it” (Weber 63). Swearengen's type of behavior was necessary for Deadwood's survival, even if his techniques don't fall far from Hearst's. Hearst saw Deadwood as an anarchical playground where he could ravish the inhabitants' way of life to make a dime. Swearengen saw Deadwood as his home, a place worthy of defense and protection and capable of growth, and Hearst as a dangerous intruder who threatened the interests of the camp. “Anarchy is what states make of it,” and these two men both take advantage of the lawlessness of the territory. The difference is Swearengen does so for the greater good of the camp, and Hearst does so only to further line his pocket.
Constructivism's fundamental theory, that “anarchy is what states make of it,” is well-supported by the plot of Deadwood. It highlights the themes of change and social practice when determining how a state will react to the threat of war. Because Deadwood's residents were so fearful of the change presented to them, they put their faith in Swearengen, the man in camp most capable of taking on Hearst. Their social practices were permitting of his decisions, which although many times immoral, were one step less immoral than Hearst's. At the point when Swearengen loses a finger to Hearst, he recognizes that he's no longer in control of the situation, and that the social practices of people living in a lawless society permitted Hearst to stake his claim in Deadwood in the first place. Weber complains that Wendt's version of Constructivism focuses too little on social practice and too heavily on identifying the individual actors behind anarchy (76). She argues that it is impractical to hold a state's actors accountable when they are only making decisions based on what is considered “normal” amongst the state's citizens. And even when a state's actors in anarchy can be identified, who is responsible for their punishment? Just like the lawless Deadwood, International Relations exist in ungoverned territory. As Tolliver fails to shoot Hearst in the back as he walks away from the mess he's made in Deadwood, the only hope for the dissolution of anarchy in the territory is it's annexation into the policy-oriented world, which could bring security and stability to the camp. Weber would argue that for Constructivism to be truly successful, Deadwood's residents must respond to this change by altering their social practices. Only then can Deadwood be an inviting and flourishing society free from the threat of anarchy.
Works Cited
Fierke, K.M. “Constructivism.” International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, Steve Smith. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. 168-169..
Weber, Cynthia. International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction. 2nd ed. New York, NY: Routledge, 2005. 14, 38, 60-76.
Saturday, March 21, 2009
POLS 354 Final
Section 1 – Question 1
Approaches to National Security – Cold War to Present
During the Cold War, the realist school of international relations rose to prominence, guided by fears of nuclear weaponry and a fundamental responsibility to protect the nation-state from an external military attack. Since this era, however, the security of the nation-state has been redefined to encapsulate the personal security of the citizens residing within it. Brian C. Schmidt explains that there is a “mainstream understanding of national security as an armed defense of territory and core values from foreign threats,” but that this belief does not define which grand theory best preserves a state's national security (164). Even though mainstream America agrees that its core values should be defended by arms, the concepts of “core values” and “armed defense” are both subjective. Because national security is now conceptualized in terms of human security, the realist approach to international relations is no longer sufficient.
The highly subjective concept of “core values” is best conveyed through the Jacksonian approach to national security. Through this approach, America is viewed as a “folk community with a strong sense of common values and common destiny.” Its people respond to notions such as “honor, independence, courage and military pride,” and they are dedicated to the unified camaraderie associated with protecting the “homeland,” Christian principles, and gun ownership. Jacksonian ideals, however, were exploited after 9/11, as the event was interpreted by Jacksonians as a clear battle between good and evil, the civilized versus the uncivilized (Kiersey). The initial ideology that the United States had a right to retribution faded once evidence began surfacing indicating that the factors surrounding the conflict were not black and white, and that moral ambiguities were inevitable in such a climate. The United States invaded Iraq under the “mainstream understanding” that it was deploying armed defense to protect the nation's “core values.” However, this war is not being fought in the same climate as the Cold War. No nuclear weaponry was located in Iraq, and mainstream America's “core values” have been exploited for some other purpose. The Jacksonian approach to foreign policy, then, has been discredited because it has been abused. Walter Russell Mead, who identified the four various approaches to national security, claimed that “Jacksonian political philosophy is often an instinct rather than an ideology, a culturally shaped outlook that the individual may not have worked out intellectually, a set of beliefs and emotions rather than a set of ideas.” This is also evident in the Jacksonian disdain for intellectualism (Kiersey). Had Bush reacted more ideologically and less emotionally, the Iraq debacle may have been averted.
The second subjective issue with Schmidt's argument is that of “armed defense.” Each different grand theory offers a different interpretation of the limitations associated with “armed defense.” Does the “mainstream understanding” of national security allow for first-strike wars? It must not be forgotten that both security and threats to it are conceptualized differently by each individual. For example, the Jeffersonian approach to national security stresses caution in foreign affairs and prefers “the least costly and dangerous methods” of protecting the United States in the dangerous state of globalization (Kiersey). This approach would rather avoid possible conflicts with other nations before they begin. The Wilsonian approach, however, claims that it is the United States' responsibility to bring civilization to less developed parts of the world, and in doing so, we must interact with other nation-states. Under this ideology, the United States is not immune from military threats, therefore, they must attempt to create as many democracies as possible in the world, as democracies are more reliable partners in ascertaining world peace than are tyrannies (Kiersey). The fact that there are such varying opinions on how threats are perceived only further demonstrates the need for a clear definition of “armed defense” in relation to national security.
President Obama's approach to foreign policy is mostly Wilsonian, as he recognizes how necessary it is to engage with other nation-states in pursuit of common goals. Now that the country is deeply embedded in an economic crisis, Hamiltonian ideas are making their way into new policies. This approach to foreign policy stresses the importance of industry and commerce as a way of creating peace (Kiersey). Certainly the new administration is focused on rebuilding the world's faith in American commerce. A Wilsonian approach with a hint of Hamiltonianism is most feasible for national security preservation today. The realist approach to international relations, coupled with the Jacksonian approach to national security, has expired. These emotional responses, inevitably, do not protect the “core values” in relation to human security. More intellectual, resolute analyses must now be made about national security, and, today, the Wilsonian approach is more reasonable than the other three identified by Mead.
Section 2 – Question 2
Neoconservative Ideeologies Damaged United States Foreign Policy
During George W. Bush's presidency, Neoconservative ideologies hijacked a Jacksonian view of national security in the attempt to seek moral vengeance on a major foreign policy actor. This action has had an immensely negative effect on United States foreign policy, as it has damaged the administration both domestically and internationally. Foong Khong lists the administration's biggest international failures as: “The failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq, the US mistreatment of prisoners in Baghdad's Abu Ghraib prison, and the eruption of a vicious civil war in Iraq.” Domestically, “US casualties in the inconclusive Iraq war” have damaged the American public's opinion of the administration (252). Bush surrounded himself with a host of fellow Neoconservatives, whose ideologies guided the hand of the United States government for eight long years. The United States' new administrators, and subsequently the new foreign policy actors, have the responsibility to employ a new grand theory in order to restore dignity to foreign policy.
The origins of Neoconservatism were located by Irving Kristol “among the disillusioned liberal intellecutals of the 1970s” (qtd. 253). The liberals, he explained, were disillusioned due to sharp tilt to the left following the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War. This was when Jacksonian “core values” were questioned, and liberals began refusing to defend themselves regarding traditional values. Neoconservatives like Kristol found this separation from moral values to be dangerous to the political system (253).
Kristol and Robert Kagan classified Neoconservatives as “fervent anti-communists, emphasizing the ideological and moral superiority of democracy, while advocating the maintenance of a strong military” (qtd. 254). Neoconservatives will advocate bigger military budgets even in times of financial hardship just to preserve “prestige and power of the United States military” (254). More than $600 billion has been spent on the war in Iraq thanks to Neoconservative ideologies, however, the United States military is less prestigious than ever before. Both domestically and internationally, the military in Iraq is viewed as an extension of Neoconservativism.
Krisol and Kagan identified four major tenets of Neoconservative foreign policy thought. The first tenet is the Neoconservative desire for moral clarity in the international arena. Neoconservatives believe that “democratic leaders and liberal democracies are good; tyrants and tyrannical regimes are bad” (qtd. 256). Therefore, morality and the interests of the state should be joined with diplomacy, and the United States has a moral responsibility to act against foreign policy actors who threaten either the interests or the morals of the United States. Furthermore, Neoconservatives conclude that the United States, as a moral institution, has the right to pass judgment on foreign nations it considers immoral. The second tenet of Neoconservative ideology is that the United States should “preserve its military preeminence in the post-Cold War world,” capitalizing on a monopoly of power by acting as “a benevolent US hegemony (256). This also relates to the third tenet, which is that the United States “should leverage its military power” to pursue foreign policy goals. Neoconservatives are quick to employ the United States as a prominent international actor because of the fourth tenet, their skepticism about the ability of international law and institutions to bring about world peace (256-7). During Bush's presidency, all of these Neoconservative tenets were applied to foreign policy.
Foong Khong discusses the various enabling “factors” and “events” which lead to the Neoconservatives' rise to preeminence during the past eight years. First, when Bush was elected president, he appointed at least eight fellow Neoconservatives to important positions in this administration. It was at this juncture that Neoconservative political thought moved from the political fringe to the political spotlight (258). Second, 9/11 gave the Bush administration a new lease to use military force in Iraq. Targeting Afghanistan was symbolic to the preservation of moral clarity in the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, and Iraq posed a similar possible threat to United States national security. Third, suspicions regarding WMDs in Iraq were announced, giving the administration further decree to take action. The one per cent doctrine cleared up any insecurities about the invasion; it stated that “even with a one percent chance of a grave threat materialzing, the US should treat that threat as a certainty and act to eliminate it” (261). One final “factor” related to the Neoconservatives' reign is that since the invasion of Iraq, they have seemingly abandoned the idea of reconstruction. They may push for forceful regime change, but they are not concerned with the idea of nation-building (262). This conflicts the Neoconservatives idea that the United States should be a benevolent arbitrator in such moral situations.
The problem with Neoconservatism is the idea of moral clarity. What is moral and in the eyes of whom? Neoconservatives maintain the United States should act as a benevelent hegemon to the world because it has the military reputation and power to do so. However, these core ideologies have been undermined by a failure to succeed in Iraq. Both internationally and domestically, there is a need for a new approach to United States foreign policy. The Bush administration's reign and the failure in Iraq is a crucial testament to the ineffectiveness of Neoconservatism in foreign policy.
Section 3
Book Review: Samantha Power's Chasing the Flame: One Man's Fight to Save the World
Chasing the Flame: One Man's Fight to Save the World by Samantha Power is the biography of Sergio Vieira de Mello, a diplomat and humanitarian whose contradictions and failures were rooted in the institution he so loyally served, the United Nations. Vieira de Mello, who climbed the UN food chain from assistant editor at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in 1969 to Special Representative of the Secretary General in Iraq in 2003, embraced international law and the UN as elements of global justice. He insisted that the only way to bring about lasting global stability is to press countries to play by international UN rules (9). But while Vieria de Mello worked diligently to spread the UN's reach to those in need, the organization's internal contradictions consistently prevented flawless peacekeeping. Power's intention is to flush out these contradictions by telling about Vieira de Mello's experiences. Ironically, Vieria de Mello was killed in a suicide bombing attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003, marking the end of a personal evolution that tracked the UN's achievements and failures (xviii).
Power focuses particularly on the UN's mistakes which were exposed in the genocidal crisis of the mid-1990s. Time and time again, she cites instances where the UN's authority prevented, rather than maintained or created, peacekeeping. A general ethic of strict political neutrality ended up favoring aggressors like the Hutu extremists in Rwanda and the Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo. In 1994, the UN mandated that soldiers in the area were not allowed to use their weapons, even in self-defense. This lead to Hutu militias massacring some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutu (pg. xvi). In 1995, the UN discouraged the use of NATO air power to end the conflict in Bosnia, therefore prolonging the devastation on the ground. Eventually, the Croatian Army and NATO forces attacked the Serbs, and the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian men and boys was halted by the UN bombing of Serbia, proving that some conflicts cannot be solved without resort to power (xvi).
Power claims that Americans today have two principles: 1) Retreat from global engagement altogether. Or 2) Go abroad to stamp out threats in the hopes of achieving full security. By the end of the 1990s, Vieria de Mello had determined that the best route to world peace is a mixture of the two. He had also concluded, by this point, that the UN needed to shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcement as a part of a new global “responsibility to protect.” The 1990s provided foreign policy with some difficult lessons. Of most importance, hard power is sometimes needed to resolve political conflicts. Because, aside from the UN, we do not have international institutions to resolve such conflicts, the UN must be willing to take a hard line with international criminals.
While it is easy to lay blame on the UN for it's peacekeeping failures, we must realize that the nation-states behind the organization fail to supply it with adequate resources, attention and manpower. Today, as the world is watching the Iraq debacle unfold, the idea that strong countries like the US should use their power to defend human rights or promote democracy around the world has become widely debated. Now focused on an overmilitarized foreign policy, we tend to forget the lessons of the 1990s, that sometimes, hard power is necessary to resolve political conflicts. However, until we have a set of international institutions and legislation intact, this type of diplomacy cannot be effectively deployed. Power describes the UN's failures well through Vieira de Mello's biography, and she provides the substance for a healthy debate on the role of international institutions in foreign policy.
Works Cited
Foong Khong, Yuen. “Neoconservativism and the Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. Ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. 252-265.
Kiersey, Nicholas. Ohio University-Chillicothe, Chillicothe, Ohio. March 2009.
Power, Samantha. Chasing the Flame: One Man's Fight to Save the World. New York: Penguin Books, 2008.
Schmidt, Brian C. “The Primacy of National Security.” Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. Ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. 162-164.
Approaches to National Security – Cold War to Present
During the Cold War, the realist school of international relations rose to prominence, guided by fears of nuclear weaponry and a fundamental responsibility to protect the nation-state from an external military attack. Since this era, however, the security of the nation-state has been redefined to encapsulate the personal security of the citizens residing within it. Brian C. Schmidt explains that there is a “mainstream understanding of national security as an armed defense of territory and core values from foreign threats,” but that this belief does not define which grand theory best preserves a state's national security (164). Even though mainstream America agrees that its core values should be defended by arms, the concepts of “core values” and “armed defense” are both subjective. Because national security is now conceptualized in terms of human security, the realist approach to international relations is no longer sufficient.
The highly subjective concept of “core values” is best conveyed through the Jacksonian approach to national security. Through this approach, America is viewed as a “folk community with a strong sense of common values and common destiny.” Its people respond to notions such as “honor, independence, courage and military pride,” and they are dedicated to the unified camaraderie associated with protecting the “homeland,” Christian principles, and gun ownership. Jacksonian ideals, however, were exploited after 9/11, as the event was interpreted by Jacksonians as a clear battle between good and evil, the civilized versus the uncivilized (Kiersey). The initial ideology that the United States had a right to retribution faded once evidence began surfacing indicating that the factors surrounding the conflict were not black and white, and that moral ambiguities were inevitable in such a climate. The United States invaded Iraq under the “mainstream understanding” that it was deploying armed defense to protect the nation's “core values.” However, this war is not being fought in the same climate as the Cold War. No nuclear weaponry was located in Iraq, and mainstream America's “core values” have been exploited for some other purpose. The Jacksonian approach to foreign policy, then, has been discredited because it has been abused. Walter Russell Mead, who identified the four various approaches to national security, claimed that “Jacksonian political philosophy is often an instinct rather than an ideology, a culturally shaped outlook that the individual may not have worked out intellectually, a set of beliefs and emotions rather than a set of ideas.” This is also evident in the Jacksonian disdain for intellectualism (Kiersey). Had Bush reacted more ideologically and less emotionally, the Iraq debacle may have been averted.
The second subjective issue with Schmidt's argument is that of “armed defense.” Each different grand theory offers a different interpretation of the limitations associated with “armed defense.” Does the “mainstream understanding” of national security allow for first-strike wars? It must not be forgotten that both security and threats to it are conceptualized differently by each individual. For example, the Jeffersonian approach to national security stresses caution in foreign affairs and prefers “the least costly and dangerous methods” of protecting the United States in the dangerous state of globalization (Kiersey). This approach would rather avoid possible conflicts with other nations before they begin. The Wilsonian approach, however, claims that it is the United States' responsibility to bring civilization to less developed parts of the world, and in doing so, we must interact with other nation-states. Under this ideology, the United States is not immune from military threats, therefore, they must attempt to create as many democracies as possible in the world, as democracies are more reliable partners in ascertaining world peace than are tyrannies (Kiersey). The fact that there are such varying opinions on how threats are perceived only further demonstrates the need for a clear definition of “armed defense” in relation to national security.
President Obama's approach to foreign policy is mostly Wilsonian, as he recognizes how necessary it is to engage with other nation-states in pursuit of common goals. Now that the country is deeply embedded in an economic crisis, Hamiltonian ideas are making their way into new policies. This approach to foreign policy stresses the importance of industry and commerce as a way of creating peace (Kiersey). Certainly the new administration is focused on rebuilding the world's faith in American commerce. A Wilsonian approach with a hint of Hamiltonianism is most feasible for national security preservation today. The realist approach to international relations, coupled with the Jacksonian approach to national security, has expired. These emotional responses, inevitably, do not protect the “core values” in relation to human security. More intellectual, resolute analyses must now be made about national security, and, today, the Wilsonian approach is more reasonable than the other three identified by Mead.
Section 2 – Question 2
Neoconservative Ideeologies Damaged United States Foreign Policy
During George W. Bush's presidency, Neoconservative ideologies hijacked a Jacksonian view of national security in the attempt to seek moral vengeance on a major foreign policy actor. This action has had an immensely negative effect on United States foreign policy, as it has damaged the administration both domestically and internationally. Foong Khong lists the administration's biggest international failures as: “The failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq, the US mistreatment of prisoners in Baghdad's Abu Ghraib prison, and the eruption of a vicious civil war in Iraq.” Domestically, “US casualties in the inconclusive Iraq war” have damaged the American public's opinion of the administration (252). Bush surrounded himself with a host of fellow Neoconservatives, whose ideologies guided the hand of the United States government for eight long years. The United States' new administrators, and subsequently the new foreign policy actors, have the responsibility to employ a new grand theory in order to restore dignity to foreign policy.
The origins of Neoconservatism were located by Irving Kristol “among the disillusioned liberal intellecutals of the 1970s” (qtd. 253). The liberals, he explained, were disillusioned due to sharp tilt to the left following the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War. This was when Jacksonian “core values” were questioned, and liberals began refusing to defend themselves regarding traditional values. Neoconservatives like Kristol found this separation from moral values to be dangerous to the political system (253).
Kristol and Robert Kagan classified Neoconservatives as “fervent anti-communists, emphasizing the ideological and moral superiority of democracy, while advocating the maintenance of a strong military” (qtd. 254). Neoconservatives will advocate bigger military budgets even in times of financial hardship just to preserve “prestige and power of the United States military” (254). More than $600 billion has been spent on the war in Iraq thanks to Neoconservative ideologies, however, the United States military is less prestigious than ever before. Both domestically and internationally, the military in Iraq is viewed as an extension of Neoconservativism.
Krisol and Kagan identified four major tenets of Neoconservative foreign policy thought. The first tenet is the Neoconservative desire for moral clarity in the international arena. Neoconservatives believe that “democratic leaders and liberal democracies are good; tyrants and tyrannical regimes are bad” (qtd. 256). Therefore, morality and the interests of the state should be joined with diplomacy, and the United States has a moral responsibility to act against foreign policy actors who threaten either the interests or the morals of the United States. Furthermore, Neoconservatives conclude that the United States, as a moral institution, has the right to pass judgment on foreign nations it considers immoral. The second tenet of Neoconservative ideology is that the United States should “preserve its military preeminence in the post-Cold War world,” capitalizing on a monopoly of power by acting as “a benevolent US hegemony (256). This also relates to the third tenet, which is that the United States “should leverage its military power” to pursue foreign policy goals. Neoconservatives are quick to employ the United States as a prominent international actor because of the fourth tenet, their skepticism about the ability of international law and institutions to bring about world peace (256-7). During Bush's presidency, all of these Neoconservative tenets were applied to foreign policy.
Foong Khong discusses the various enabling “factors” and “events” which lead to the Neoconservatives' rise to preeminence during the past eight years. First, when Bush was elected president, he appointed at least eight fellow Neoconservatives to important positions in this administration. It was at this juncture that Neoconservative political thought moved from the political fringe to the political spotlight (258). Second, 9/11 gave the Bush administration a new lease to use military force in Iraq. Targeting Afghanistan was symbolic to the preservation of moral clarity in the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, and Iraq posed a similar possible threat to United States national security. Third, suspicions regarding WMDs in Iraq were announced, giving the administration further decree to take action. The one per cent doctrine cleared up any insecurities about the invasion; it stated that “even with a one percent chance of a grave threat materialzing, the US should treat that threat as a certainty and act to eliminate it” (261). One final “factor” related to the Neoconservatives' reign is that since the invasion of Iraq, they have seemingly abandoned the idea of reconstruction. They may push for forceful regime change, but they are not concerned with the idea of nation-building (262). This conflicts the Neoconservatives idea that the United States should be a benevolent arbitrator in such moral situations.
The problem with Neoconservatism is the idea of moral clarity. What is moral and in the eyes of whom? Neoconservatives maintain the United States should act as a benevelent hegemon to the world because it has the military reputation and power to do so. However, these core ideologies have been undermined by a failure to succeed in Iraq. Both internationally and domestically, there is a need for a new approach to United States foreign policy. The Bush administration's reign and the failure in Iraq is a crucial testament to the ineffectiveness of Neoconservatism in foreign policy.
Section 3
Book Review: Samantha Power's Chasing the Flame: One Man's Fight to Save the World
Chasing the Flame: One Man's Fight to Save the World by Samantha Power is the biography of Sergio Vieira de Mello, a diplomat and humanitarian whose contradictions and failures were rooted in the institution he so loyally served, the United Nations. Vieira de Mello, who climbed the UN food chain from assistant editor at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in 1969 to Special Representative of the Secretary General in Iraq in 2003, embraced international law and the UN as elements of global justice. He insisted that the only way to bring about lasting global stability is to press countries to play by international UN rules (9). But while Vieria de Mello worked diligently to spread the UN's reach to those in need, the organization's internal contradictions consistently prevented flawless peacekeeping. Power's intention is to flush out these contradictions by telling about Vieira de Mello's experiences. Ironically, Vieria de Mello was killed in a suicide bombing attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003, marking the end of a personal evolution that tracked the UN's achievements and failures (xviii).
Power focuses particularly on the UN's mistakes which were exposed in the genocidal crisis of the mid-1990s. Time and time again, she cites instances where the UN's authority prevented, rather than maintained or created, peacekeeping. A general ethic of strict political neutrality ended up favoring aggressors like the Hutu extremists in Rwanda and the Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo. In 1994, the UN mandated that soldiers in the area were not allowed to use their weapons, even in self-defense. This lead to Hutu militias massacring some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutu (pg. xvi). In 1995, the UN discouraged the use of NATO air power to end the conflict in Bosnia, therefore prolonging the devastation on the ground. Eventually, the Croatian Army and NATO forces attacked the Serbs, and the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian men and boys was halted by the UN bombing of Serbia, proving that some conflicts cannot be solved without resort to power (xvi).
Power claims that Americans today have two principles: 1) Retreat from global engagement altogether. Or 2) Go abroad to stamp out threats in the hopes of achieving full security. By the end of the 1990s, Vieria de Mello had determined that the best route to world peace is a mixture of the two. He had also concluded, by this point, that the UN needed to shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcement as a part of a new global “responsibility to protect.” The 1990s provided foreign policy with some difficult lessons. Of most importance, hard power is sometimes needed to resolve political conflicts. Because, aside from the UN, we do not have international institutions to resolve such conflicts, the UN must be willing to take a hard line with international criminals.
While it is easy to lay blame on the UN for it's peacekeeping failures, we must realize that the nation-states behind the organization fail to supply it with adequate resources, attention and manpower. Today, as the world is watching the Iraq debacle unfold, the idea that strong countries like the US should use their power to defend human rights or promote democracy around the world has become widely debated. Now focused on an overmilitarized foreign policy, we tend to forget the lessons of the 1990s, that sometimes, hard power is necessary to resolve political conflicts. However, until we have a set of international institutions and legislation intact, this type of diplomacy cannot be effectively deployed. Power describes the UN's failures well through Vieira de Mello's biography, and she provides the substance for a healthy debate on the role of international institutions in foreign policy.
Works Cited
Foong Khong, Yuen. “Neoconservativism and the Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: The Role of Ideas in Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. Ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. 252-265.
Kiersey, Nicholas. Ohio University-Chillicothe, Chillicothe, Ohio. March 2009.
Power, Samantha. Chasing the Flame: One Man's Fight to Save the World. New York: Penguin Books, 2008.
Schmidt, Brian C. “The Primacy of National Security.” Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. Ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. 162-164.
Saturday, March 7, 2009
Obama vs. McCain on Foreign Policy
As long as I've been involved in politics, I've held a strong isolationist view regarding foreign policy. Why should we be the world's police? Here in America, at home, we have enough problems to worry about: a broken educational system, a crippling health care industry, and an embarrassing divide between the rich and the poor. Wars have always seemed foolish to me, especially when we aren't being threatened directly. I never understood Vietnam and I still don't understand Iraq. I always praised Bill Clinton for his ability to sit down with world leaders and draw up treaties. I don't think I've seen George W. Bush do that once in his eight long, miserable years as president. His internationalism has made him a bully – doing what he wants when he wants to, with disregard for the opinions of his fellow world leaders.
Therefore, when this election season came about, I was excited to hear all the candidates – particularly the Democrat candidates – had to offer regarding the war in Iraq and our involvement in other nations' problems. I declared my position as a Democrat when I turned 18 and started voting. It was at that point-in-time that I realized a little bit about how the world works, and I discovered that conservatives enjoy war more than liberals. I found that conservatives get their leg up on society by practicing war and by bullying others into a corner to get what they want. Liberals, on the other hand, tend to look out for the best interest of everyone involved, for the most part (I'm not saying there aren't bad Democrats.), and are more cautious about decisions affecting millions of lives. They are more willing to reach an agreement regarding any given situation. The Republicans call it weak; I call it smart. Who wants to be a bully, anyway?
My views regarding foreign policy changed somewhat, though, once I enrolled in Political Science 103. Never before had I seen foreign policy through the Mackin lens – a very clear, honest depiction of what is really going on in the world. The picture was painted nicely for me. Our forefathers set the stage for Manifest Destiny, creating the base of a nation powerful enough to rule the world. By doing that, it has been necessary to be visible worldwide. We've made ourselves visible worldwide by positioning our military forces where necessary – currently in about 100 countries. These forces work maritime magic, making trade possible, protecting weak borders, and keeping an eye on instabilities that might soon be a threat to the homeland. Never before did I have such an appreciation for our military. Now that I understand their purpose a little better, I have great pride in our military, and am grateful for their duties abroad, even if I still think we could reduce our military involvement in certain areas of the world.
Regarding Iraq, I have been itching for a candidate to come along and promise to withdraw our troops immediately. Americans are still unsure of exactly why we are there. It has something to do with oil, something to do with vengeance, and next-to-nothing to do with counter-terrorism. For heaven's sake, it was our Central Intelligence Agency that taught these terrorists the most effective ways to blow us up. I don't buy it. Then, a miracle happened. A man named Barack Obama came along, making his bid for the Presidency. He offers a fresh, new outlook on politics, promising to clean up Washington, eliminating power-hunger and the bullying tactics the conservatives have offered for so long. He also promises to end the War in Iraq, beginning with almost immediate troop withdrawals if he is elected. This is my one problem with Obama, whom I support very strongly. Obama will not bring all of our troops home immediately. With Iran already threatening both Iraq and the United States, we cannot pull out of this conflict without creating a worse situation. If we leave Iraq in a weakened state, Iran will invade, and we will be right back to square one, but in a much deeper situation. Then, thanks to the nuclear weaponry Vice President Dick Cheney and Haliburton set them up with, we will be an obvious target for Iran. Obama says if the problem in Iraq escalates once we begin withdrawing troops, we'll just send them back in. This might work, but like Mackin says, you can't move these people around like chess pieces on a board. It's dangerous and irresponsible. Still, I want to see us out of Iraq, but I don't think even Obama can do that just yet. It's going to take time, no matter what. I think, however, that Obama can regain the trust and support of fellow countries, which, I think, is the first step to winning any conflict.
In the remainder of this essay, I will outline the foreign policy views of both Obama and his Republican opponent, John McCain. The majority of this information comes directly from each candidate's Web site.
Barack Obama on Foreign Policy
“When I am this party's nominee, my opponent will not be able to say that I voted for the war in Iraq; or that I gave George Bush the benefit of the doubt on Iran; or that I supported Bush-Cheney policies of not talking to leaders that we don't like. And he will not be able to say that I wavered on something as fundamental as whether or not it is ok for America to torture — because it is never ok… I will end the war in Iraq… I will close Guantanamo. I will restore habeas corpus. I will finish the fight against Al Qaeda. And I will lead the world to combat the common threats of the 21st century: nuclear weapons and terrorism; climate change and poverty; genocide and disease. And I will send once more a message to those yearning faces beyond our shores that says, "You matter to us. Your future is our future. And our moment is now.”
Obama plans to end the war in Iraq with immediate troop withdrawal, bringing home one to two combat brigades each month, with all troops removed within sixteen months. He vows to build no permanent bases in Iraq, but will maintain some troops to protect our embassy and diplomats. The next step is to “press Iraq's leaders to take responsibility for their future ... to make it clear that we are leaving.” This part of the plan requires assistance from the United Nations to discuss issues like federalism and oil revenue-sharing. The remainder of this agenda involves working with Iraq's surrounding nations to build strong borders and safe havens for Iraqi refugees. As far as Iran goes, Obama wants to sit down and talk with its leaders, a move the Bush administration has failed to attempt.
Obama also promises to crack down on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He wants to secure all loose nuclear materials throughout the world within four years, negotiate a verifiable ban on the production of new nuclear weapons, and take steps to create a world free of nuclear weapons altogether.
Obama also plans to aid foreign involvement by strengthening our military, adding 65,000 soldiers to the Army and 27,000 Marines. He vows to give our troops new equipment, armor, training, and skills like language training.
Obama's Web site states, “Under the Bush administration, foreign policy has been used as a political wedge issue to divide us – not as a cause to bring America together. And it is no coincidence that one of the most secretive administrations in history has pursued policies that have been disastrous for the American people. Obama strongly believes that our foreign policy is stronger when Americans are united, and the government is open and candid with the American people.”
John McCain on Foreign Policy
“I know the pain war causes. I understand the frustration caused by our mistakes in this war. And I regret sincerely the additional sacrifices imposed on the brave Americans who defend us. But I also know the toll a lost war takes on an army and on our country's security. By giving General Petraeus and the men and women he has the honor to command the time and support necessary to succeed in Iraq we have before us a hard road. But it is the right road. It is necessary and just. Those who disregard the unmistakable progress we have made in the last year and the terrible consequences that would ensue were we to abandon our responsibilities in Iraq have chosen another road. It may appear to be the easier course of action, but it is a much more reckless one, and it does them no credit even if it gives them an advantage in the next election.”
McCain is clearly a military man, from military roots, and thinks that a strong military is the only way to international freedom. He says that to protect our homeland, our interests and our values, America must have the best-manned, best-equipped, and best-supported military in the world. He says that we should respond to any crisis that endangers American security militarily, and in doing so, we will prevail in any conflict we are forced to fight.
McCain is focused on fighting terrorism. He plans to do this, if elected, through quality intelligence, which he says will be used to uncover plots before they take root. He says this can be done without infringing on the rights of American citizens, and that restricting the freedoms for which our nation stands would give terrorists the victory they seek. However, with documents such as the Patriot Act, our rights are being taken away one by one. I feel that these “freedoms” are being taken away, contrary to what McCain seems to believe.
McCain also promises smarter defense spending, claiming the need to reform our defense acquisition process to ensure that taxpayers' dollars are actually spent on U.S. security rather than parochial interests. He says that military funds should be appropriated regularly, not by “emergency” supplementals that makes Congressional pork-barrel spending possible. Regarding Iraq, McCain says that the answer is not unconditional dialogues from a “position of weakness.” He says real pressure must be applied on Iran in order for it to change its behavior. Again, he insists on doing this with military posture.
In the end, I will vote for Barack Obama. While I have a greater appreciation for our military now, I still don't think forceful actions solve everything. I would like my President to exhaust every possibility necessary without going to war, and I believe Obama will do that. McCain, however, is a close second to Bush, and I'm ready to wave his administration and policies out the door. I won't be voting for four more years of the same tactics the conservatives have offered for the past eight. I honestly do understand that McCain has more military experience and that he may understand foreign policy better than Obama. However, I'm ready for a total change, and I have to hope that Obama will surround himself with leaders just as intelligent on the subject as McCain. I like Obama's approach, and to be honest, I'd take anything over the Republican school of thought in America today.
References
Associated Press. (2008, May 16.) Obama calls McCain foreign policy 'naïve.'
Barack Obama's Web site. Barack Obama's plan to secure America and restore our standing.
John McCain's Web site. National Security: A Strong Military in a Dangerous World.
John McCain's Web site. Strategy for Victory in Iraq.
Renewing American Leadership. (2007, July/August). Foreign Affairs.
Therefore, when this election season came about, I was excited to hear all the candidates – particularly the Democrat candidates – had to offer regarding the war in Iraq and our involvement in other nations' problems. I declared my position as a Democrat when I turned 18 and started voting. It was at that point-in-time that I realized a little bit about how the world works, and I discovered that conservatives enjoy war more than liberals. I found that conservatives get their leg up on society by practicing war and by bullying others into a corner to get what they want. Liberals, on the other hand, tend to look out for the best interest of everyone involved, for the most part (I'm not saying there aren't bad Democrats.), and are more cautious about decisions affecting millions of lives. They are more willing to reach an agreement regarding any given situation. The Republicans call it weak; I call it smart. Who wants to be a bully, anyway?
My views regarding foreign policy changed somewhat, though, once I enrolled in Political Science 103. Never before had I seen foreign policy through the Mackin lens – a very clear, honest depiction of what is really going on in the world. The picture was painted nicely for me. Our forefathers set the stage for Manifest Destiny, creating the base of a nation powerful enough to rule the world. By doing that, it has been necessary to be visible worldwide. We've made ourselves visible worldwide by positioning our military forces where necessary – currently in about 100 countries. These forces work maritime magic, making trade possible, protecting weak borders, and keeping an eye on instabilities that might soon be a threat to the homeland. Never before did I have such an appreciation for our military. Now that I understand their purpose a little better, I have great pride in our military, and am grateful for their duties abroad, even if I still think we could reduce our military involvement in certain areas of the world.
Regarding Iraq, I have been itching for a candidate to come along and promise to withdraw our troops immediately. Americans are still unsure of exactly why we are there. It has something to do with oil, something to do with vengeance, and next-to-nothing to do with counter-terrorism. For heaven's sake, it was our Central Intelligence Agency that taught these terrorists the most effective ways to blow us up. I don't buy it. Then, a miracle happened. A man named Barack Obama came along, making his bid for the Presidency. He offers a fresh, new outlook on politics, promising to clean up Washington, eliminating power-hunger and the bullying tactics the conservatives have offered for so long. He also promises to end the War in Iraq, beginning with almost immediate troop withdrawals if he is elected. This is my one problem with Obama, whom I support very strongly. Obama will not bring all of our troops home immediately. With Iran already threatening both Iraq and the United States, we cannot pull out of this conflict without creating a worse situation. If we leave Iraq in a weakened state, Iran will invade, and we will be right back to square one, but in a much deeper situation. Then, thanks to the nuclear weaponry Vice President Dick Cheney and Haliburton set them up with, we will be an obvious target for Iran. Obama says if the problem in Iraq escalates once we begin withdrawing troops, we'll just send them back in. This might work, but like Mackin says, you can't move these people around like chess pieces on a board. It's dangerous and irresponsible. Still, I want to see us out of Iraq, but I don't think even Obama can do that just yet. It's going to take time, no matter what. I think, however, that Obama can regain the trust and support of fellow countries, which, I think, is the first step to winning any conflict.
In the remainder of this essay, I will outline the foreign policy views of both Obama and his Republican opponent, John McCain. The majority of this information comes directly from each candidate's Web site.
Barack Obama on Foreign Policy
“When I am this party's nominee, my opponent will not be able to say that I voted for the war in Iraq; or that I gave George Bush the benefit of the doubt on Iran; or that I supported Bush-Cheney policies of not talking to leaders that we don't like. And he will not be able to say that I wavered on something as fundamental as whether or not it is ok for America to torture — because it is never ok… I will end the war in Iraq… I will close Guantanamo. I will restore habeas corpus. I will finish the fight against Al Qaeda. And I will lead the world to combat the common threats of the 21st century: nuclear weapons and terrorism; climate change and poverty; genocide and disease. And I will send once more a message to those yearning faces beyond our shores that says, "You matter to us. Your future is our future. And our moment is now.”
Obama plans to end the war in Iraq with immediate troop withdrawal, bringing home one to two combat brigades each month, with all troops removed within sixteen months. He vows to build no permanent bases in Iraq, but will maintain some troops to protect our embassy and diplomats. The next step is to “press Iraq's leaders to take responsibility for their future ... to make it clear that we are leaving.” This part of the plan requires assistance from the United Nations to discuss issues like federalism and oil revenue-sharing. The remainder of this agenda involves working with Iraq's surrounding nations to build strong borders and safe havens for Iraqi refugees. As far as Iran goes, Obama wants to sit down and talk with its leaders, a move the Bush administration has failed to attempt.
Obama also promises to crack down on the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He wants to secure all loose nuclear materials throughout the world within four years, negotiate a verifiable ban on the production of new nuclear weapons, and take steps to create a world free of nuclear weapons altogether.
Obama also plans to aid foreign involvement by strengthening our military, adding 65,000 soldiers to the Army and 27,000 Marines. He vows to give our troops new equipment, armor, training, and skills like language training.
Obama's Web site states, “Under the Bush administration, foreign policy has been used as a political wedge issue to divide us – not as a cause to bring America together. And it is no coincidence that one of the most secretive administrations in history has pursued policies that have been disastrous for the American people. Obama strongly believes that our foreign policy is stronger when Americans are united, and the government is open and candid with the American people.”
John McCain on Foreign Policy
“I know the pain war causes. I understand the frustration caused by our mistakes in this war. And I regret sincerely the additional sacrifices imposed on the brave Americans who defend us. But I also know the toll a lost war takes on an army and on our country's security. By giving General Petraeus and the men and women he has the honor to command the time and support necessary to succeed in Iraq we have before us a hard road. But it is the right road. It is necessary and just. Those who disregard the unmistakable progress we have made in the last year and the terrible consequences that would ensue were we to abandon our responsibilities in Iraq have chosen another road. It may appear to be the easier course of action, but it is a much more reckless one, and it does them no credit even if it gives them an advantage in the next election.”
McCain is clearly a military man, from military roots, and thinks that a strong military is the only way to international freedom. He says that to protect our homeland, our interests and our values, America must have the best-manned, best-equipped, and best-supported military in the world. He says that we should respond to any crisis that endangers American security militarily, and in doing so, we will prevail in any conflict we are forced to fight.
McCain is focused on fighting terrorism. He plans to do this, if elected, through quality intelligence, which he says will be used to uncover plots before they take root. He says this can be done without infringing on the rights of American citizens, and that restricting the freedoms for which our nation stands would give terrorists the victory they seek. However, with documents such as the Patriot Act, our rights are being taken away one by one. I feel that these “freedoms” are being taken away, contrary to what McCain seems to believe.
McCain also promises smarter defense spending, claiming the need to reform our defense acquisition process to ensure that taxpayers' dollars are actually spent on U.S. security rather than parochial interests. He says that military funds should be appropriated regularly, not by “emergency” supplementals that makes Congressional pork-barrel spending possible. Regarding Iraq, McCain says that the answer is not unconditional dialogues from a “position of weakness.” He says real pressure must be applied on Iran in order for it to change its behavior. Again, he insists on doing this with military posture.
In the end, I will vote for Barack Obama. While I have a greater appreciation for our military now, I still don't think forceful actions solve everything. I would like my President to exhaust every possibility necessary without going to war, and I believe Obama will do that. McCain, however, is a close second to Bush, and I'm ready to wave his administration and policies out the door. I won't be voting for four more years of the same tactics the conservatives have offered for the past eight. I honestly do understand that McCain has more military experience and that he may understand foreign policy better than Obama. However, I'm ready for a total change, and I have to hope that Obama will surround himself with leaders just as intelligent on the subject as McCain. I like Obama's approach, and to be honest, I'd take anything over the Republican school of thought in America today.
References
Associated Press. (2008, May 16.) Obama calls McCain foreign policy 'naïve.'
Barack Obama's Web site. Barack Obama's plan to secure America and restore our standing.
John McCain's Web site. National Security: A Strong Military in a Dangerous World.
John McCain's Web site. Strategy for Victory in Iraq.
Renewing American Leadership. (2007, July/August). Foreign Affairs.
Journal on Conor Foley's The Thin Blue Line, Chapters 1-4
Conor Foley's The Thin Blue Line: How Humanitarianism Went To War is essential to the growing debate over how to deal with humanitarian crises. It picks up immediately where Samantha Power left off, with the terrorist bombing of the UN headquarters (and subsequent death of humanitarian Sergio Vieria de Mello) in Baghdad in August 2003 (pg. 1). Foley introduces his book by explaining the controversy surrounding the US invasion of Iraq, noting that the country “descended into chaos” once we chose to invade. Foley explains two schools of through regarding the invasion. One side of the argument believes the invasion represents both a weakening of national sovereignty and attention paid to international law. These “anti-imperialists,” as he refers to them, argue that human rights and democracy can never be imposed on a people by force of arms, and that our attempt to do so is nothing more than “old-fashioned imperialism.” The second faction, the “liberal interventionists,” believe that our business in Iraq is just, and that we were responsible for bringing Saddam Hussein, a dictator known to disregard the human rights of his people, to justice (pg. 2).
Foley proceeds to discuss the political dilemma human rights and non-governmental organizations face. He explains that such NGOs typically rely on neutrality to meet their objectives when providing relief assistance during conflict and natural disasters. However, in many situations, a military presence is required to get the job done. In many situations, humanitarian relief can only be met with force against those who are inhibiting the human rights of the people. When this happens, what Foley refers to as “political humanitarianism” is the result. Like Power, he refers to Bosnia and Rwanda as incidents where the UN prolonged suffering and crimes against humanity (pg. 4).
For the purpose of my journal, and because I found this most interesting, I'm going to skip to Chapter Four's topic: Afghanistan. I was very disturbed to learn the details of our retaliation against Afghanistan following the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks of September 11, 2001. Less than a month later, through Operation Enduring Freedom, the US launched a series of air strikes against the Taliban's Northern Alliance. According to Foley, we struck on the side of the Taliban's opposing forces; we were merely helping out in a civil war. In the end, our air strikes did not prevail, but suitcases full of cash did. We simply bought off the Taliban commanders. Foley quotes journalist Bob Woodward on the incident: “'In all, the US commitment to overthrow the Taliban [was] 110 CIA officers and 316 Special Forces personnel, plus massive airpower'” (pgs. 96-97).
Foley describes Afghanistan's terrain, which is strewn across mountains, and explains how nearly impossible it is for military aircraft to identify targets on the ground. This is one reason the US has chosen to abandon the search for Taliban officials in Afghanistan. He says military officials regularly complained, “There's not much point dropping a million-dollar missile on a ten dollar tent” (pg. 95). I would imagine that if we do not have the technology to locate dangerous targets hiding in unnavigable terrain, then our military had best invest in such technologies immediately.
Even though the US did bomb Afghanistan and leave it in the hands of battling warlords, UN attempts to secure the country with peacekeeping forces were not supported. Foley cites former President Bush's comments on the matter (as given by a spokesperson in February 2002): “The President continues to believe that the purpose of [the] military is to be used to fight and win wars, and not to engage in peacekeeping of that nature” (pg. 98). First of all, the US has been a part of “peacekeeping” of that nature for decades, and we've certainly been involved in nation-building. This statement is proof that foreign policy actors can and will bend the rules to their liking. I think our abandonment of Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq makes this obvious. Foley makes an excellent case against the US' intentions for humanitarianism.
Work Cited
Foley, Conor. The Thin Blue Line: How Humanitarianism Went To War. New York: Verso, 2008.
Foley proceeds to discuss the political dilemma human rights and non-governmental organizations face. He explains that such NGOs typically rely on neutrality to meet their objectives when providing relief assistance during conflict and natural disasters. However, in many situations, a military presence is required to get the job done. In many situations, humanitarian relief can only be met with force against those who are inhibiting the human rights of the people. When this happens, what Foley refers to as “political humanitarianism” is the result. Like Power, he refers to Bosnia and Rwanda as incidents where the UN prolonged suffering and crimes against humanity (pg. 4).
For the purpose of my journal, and because I found this most interesting, I'm going to skip to Chapter Four's topic: Afghanistan. I was very disturbed to learn the details of our retaliation against Afghanistan following the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks of September 11, 2001. Less than a month later, through Operation Enduring Freedom, the US launched a series of air strikes against the Taliban's Northern Alliance. According to Foley, we struck on the side of the Taliban's opposing forces; we were merely helping out in a civil war. In the end, our air strikes did not prevail, but suitcases full of cash did. We simply bought off the Taliban commanders. Foley quotes journalist Bob Woodward on the incident: “'In all, the US commitment to overthrow the Taliban [was] 110 CIA officers and 316 Special Forces personnel, plus massive airpower'” (pgs. 96-97).
Foley describes Afghanistan's terrain, which is strewn across mountains, and explains how nearly impossible it is for military aircraft to identify targets on the ground. This is one reason the US has chosen to abandon the search for Taliban officials in Afghanistan. He says military officials regularly complained, “There's not much point dropping a million-dollar missile on a ten dollar tent” (pg. 95). I would imagine that if we do not have the technology to locate dangerous targets hiding in unnavigable terrain, then our military had best invest in such technologies immediately.
Even though the US did bomb Afghanistan and leave it in the hands of battling warlords, UN attempts to secure the country with peacekeeping forces were not supported. Foley cites former President Bush's comments on the matter (as given by a spokesperson in February 2002): “The President continues to believe that the purpose of [the] military is to be used to fight and win wars, and not to engage in peacekeeping of that nature” (pg. 98). First of all, the US has been a part of “peacekeeping” of that nature for decades, and we've certainly been involved in nation-building. This statement is proof that foreign policy actors can and will bend the rules to their liking. I think our abandonment of Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq makes this obvious. Foley makes an excellent case against the US' intentions for humanitarianism.
Work Cited
Foley, Conor. The Thin Blue Line: How Humanitarianism Went To War. New York: Verso, 2008.
Journal on Samantha Power's Chasing the Flame: One Man's Fight to Save the World, Chapters 1-11
Through her book, Chasing the Flame: One Man's Fight to Save the World, Samantha Power tells the story of Sergio Vieria de Mello, a diplomat and humanitarian whose contradictions and failures were rooted in the institution he so loyally served, the United Nations. Vieria de Mello, who climbed the UN food chain from assistant editor at the UN High Commissioner for Refugees in 1969 to Special Representative of the Secretary General in Iraq in 2003, embraced international law and the UN as elements of global justice. He insisted that the only way to bring about lasting global stability is to press countries to play by international UN rules (pg. 9). But while Vieria de Mello worked diligently to spread the UN's reach to those in need, the organization's internal contradictions consistently prevented flawless peacekeeping. Ironically, Vieria de Mello was killed in a suicide bombing attack on the UN headquarters in Baghdad in August 2003, marking the end of a personal evolution that tracked the UN's achievements and failures (pg. xviii).
Power focuses particularly on the UN's mistakes which were rudely exposed in the genocidal crisis of the mid-1990s. Time and time again, she cites instances where the UN's authority prevented, rather than maintained or created, peacekeeping. A general ethic of strict political neutrality ended up favoring aggressors like the Hutu extremists in Rwanda and the Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo. In 1994, the UN mandated that soldiers in the area were not allowed to use their weapons, even in self-defense. This lead to Hutu militias massacring some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutu (pg. xvi). In 1995, the UN discouraged the use of NATO air power to end the conflict in Bosnia, therefore prolonging the devastation on the ground. Eventually, the Croatian Army and NATO forces attacked the Serbs, and the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian men and boys was halted by the UN bombing of Serbia, proving that some conflicts cannot be solved without resort to power (pg. xvi).
Power claims that Americans today have two principles: 1) Retreat from global engagement altogether. Or 2) Go abroad to stamp out threats in the hopes of achieving full security. By the end of the 1990s, Vieria de Mello had determined that the best route to world peace is a mixture of the two. He had also concluded, by this point, that the UN needed to shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcement as a part of a new global “responsibility to protect.” The 1990s provided foreign policy with some difficult lessons. Of most importance, hard power is sometimes needed to resolve political conflicts. Because, aside from the UN, we do not have international institutions to resolve such conflicts, the UN must be willing to take a hard line with international criminals.
While it is easy to lay blame on the UN for it's peacekeeping failures, we must realize that the powers behind the organization fail to supply it with adequate resources, attention and manpower. Today, as the world is watching the Iraq debacle unfold, the idea that strong countries like the US should use their power to defend human rights or promote democracy around the world has become widely debated. Now focused on an overmilitarized foreign policy, we tend to forget the lessons of the 1990s, that sometimes, hard power is necessary to resolve political conflicts. However, until we have a set of international institutions and legislation intact, this type of diplomacy cannot be effectively deployed.
Work Cited
Power, Samantha. Chasing the Flame: One Man's Fight to Save the World. New York: Penguin Books, 2008.
Power focuses particularly on the UN's mistakes which were rudely exposed in the genocidal crisis of the mid-1990s. Time and time again, she cites instances where the UN's authority prevented, rather than maintained or created, peacekeeping. A general ethic of strict political neutrality ended up favoring aggressors like the Hutu extremists in Rwanda and the Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo. In 1994, the UN mandated that soldiers in the area were not allowed to use their weapons, even in self-defense. This lead to Hutu militias massacring some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutu (pg. xvi). In 1995, the UN discouraged the use of NATO air power to end the conflict in Bosnia, therefore prolonging the devastation on the ground. Eventually, the Croatian Army and NATO forces attacked the Serbs, and the ethnic cleansing of Bosnian men and boys was halted by the UN bombing of Serbia, proving that some conflicts cannot be solved without resort to power (pg. xvi).
Power claims that Americans today have two principles: 1) Retreat from global engagement altogether. Or 2) Go abroad to stamp out threats in the hopes of achieving full security. By the end of the 1990s, Vieria de Mello had determined that the best route to world peace is a mixture of the two. He had also concluded, by this point, that the UN needed to shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcement as a part of a new global “responsibility to protect.” The 1990s provided foreign policy with some difficult lessons. Of most importance, hard power is sometimes needed to resolve political conflicts. Because, aside from the UN, we do not have international institutions to resolve such conflicts, the UN must be willing to take a hard line with international criminals.
While it is easy to lay blame on the UN for it's peacekeeping failures, we must realize that the powers behind the organization fail to supply it with adequate resources, attention and manpower. Today, as the world is watching the Iraq debacle unfold, the idea that strong countries like the US should use their power to defend human rights or promote democracy around the world has become widely debated. Now focused on an overmilitarized foreign policy, we tend to forget the lessons of the 1990s, that sometimes, hard power is necessary to resolve political conflicts. However, until we have a set of international institutions and legislation intact, this type of diplomacy cannot be effectively deployed.
Work Cited
Power, Samantha. Chasing the Flame: One Man's Fight to Save the World. New York: Penguin Books, 2008.
Journal on Rashid Khalidi's The Iron Cage, Chapters 1-4
Rashid Khalidi claims that the goal of his book, The Iron Cage, is to explore the rigid constraints imposed upon Palestinians and the powerful actors who are responsible for having created the delicate situation the Palestinian people are faced with (p. X-XI). Palestinians are quick to claim dependency upon others, Khalidi asserts, explaining that the Palestinian people lack the guidance of a political agency. He also aims to illuminate the context in which the powerful actors were operating in when bestowing upon the Palestinians this particular ordeal. Palestinian people continue to engage in conflict with Israelis in opposition of their displacement. Khalidi claims that until the Palestinians are offered a variety of options, they cannot learn from the past and begin making sound decisions. They continue to make bad decisions because of the rigid constraints they are living under; they must balance this with the little freedom they are given.
I found myself diving into Khalidi's book to further explore his accusation of America and Israel acting cooperatively to seemingly eliminate the discussion of a Palestinian state. The author describes America's role in this in detail. First, he claims, America is attempting to force Palestinians into going back on their democratic choice. I can only assume this is to create further dissension among political factions in the area. Secondly, America is involved in the active financial and diplomatic boycott of the Palestinian Authority. Finally, America is utilizing its many resources in training and funding to encourage the Fetah to attack enemies in the area, with the ultimate goal of eliminating Palestine. Khalidi also points out Israel's blatant involvement in this scheme. It insists on withholding Palestinian taxes and refuses to ease restrictions on the movement of goods in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (p. X).
But America's involvement in insisting the state of Palestine never come to fruition goes back further than claims about the recent Bush administration and Israeli government's involvement. Khalidi talks about the development of the Jewish state in 1948 and the blatant “abortion” of the Palestinian state (p. XVII). An independent Arab state in Palestine posed a grave threat to the world then and now, Khalidi mentions. This is the statement that I've lingered on throughout my reading of this book. Why is an independent Arab state more threatening than a democratic Jewish state? I am concerned with this question because I wonder why one culture is preferred by the Western audience; is this a religious, philosophical, or merely political issue? Khalidi explains that the British Mandate included the entire text of the Balfour Declaration, which insisted that the Palestinians support the endeavor to create a nation for the displaced Jews. Because the Palestinians did not agree with the mandate and the order to be displaced from their country (Arabs constituted 90 percent of the Palestinian population), they were ostracized and deemed by the League of Nations and Great Britain to definitely not be recognized as a people (p. 32).
The next stop on this train of thought is the irony in the United States' relationship with the very entities that caused a catastrophe the magnitude of 9/11. Khalidi explains that the United States is responsible for promoting the same “reactionary, obscurantist, and illiberal Islamic tendencies” that eventually were used against us during the attacks (p. XX). He also highlights the fact that the media obscures the United States' actual relationship with these terrorists and paints for us a picture that Palestinians “hate our freedom,” and “resent our culture” (p. XXI). In fact, the United States is responsible for many of the disastrous consequences that have been faced by the people of Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds.
Work Cited
Khalidi, Rashid. The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Boston: Beacon Press, 2006-7.
I found myself diving into Khalidi's book to further explore his accusation of America and Israel acting cooperatively to seemingly eliminate the discussion of a Palestinian state. The author describes America's role in this in detail. First, he claims, America is attempting to force Palestinians into going back on their democratic choice. I can only assume this is to create further dissension among political factions in the area. Secondly, America is involved in the active financial and diplomatic boycott of the Palestinian Authority. Finally, America is utilizing its many resources in training and funding to encourage the Fetah to attack enemies in the area, with the ultimate goal of eliminating Palestine. Khalidi also points out Israel's blatant involvement in this scheme. It insists on withholding Palestinian taxes and refuses to ease restrictions on the movement of goods in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (p. X).
But America's involvement in insisting the state of Palestine never come to fruition goes back further than claims about the recent Bush administration and Israeli government's involvement. Khalidi talks about the development of the Jewish state in 1948 and the blatant “abortion” of the Palestinian state (p. XVII). An independent Arab state in Palestine posed a grave threat to the world then and now, Khalidi mentions. This is the statement that I've lingered on throughout my reading of this book. Why is an independent Arab state more threatening than a democratic Jewish state? I am concerned with this question because I wonder why one culture is preferred by the Western audience; is this a religious, philosophical, or merely political issue? Khalidi explains that the British Mandate included the entire text of the Balfour Declaration, which insisted that the Palestinians support the endeavor to create a nation for the displaced Jews. Because the Palestinians did not agree with the mandate and the order to be displaced from their country (Arabs constituted 90 percent of the Palestinian population), they were ostracized and deemed by the League of Nations and Great Britain to definitely not be recognized as a people (p. 32).
The next stop on this train of thought is the irony in the United States' relationship with the very entities that caused a catastrophe the magnitude of 9/11. Khalidi explains that the United States is responsible for promoting the same “reactionary, obscurantist, and illiberal Islamic tendencies” that eventually were used against us during the attacks (p. XX). He also highlights the fact that the media obscures the United States' actual relationship with these terrorists and paints for us a picture that Palestinians “hate our freedom,” and “resent our culture” (p. XXI). In fact, the United States is responsible for many of the disastrous consequences that have been faced by the people of Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds.
Work Cited
Khalidi, Rashid. The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Boston: Beacon Press, 2006-7.
POLS 354 Midterm
Section 1 – Question 1:
Today's World Demanding of Theories Outside of Realism
Realism, the core of International Relations theory, has provided a stable backdrop for those involved in foreign policy decisions to build upon. Skeptical about the capacity of human reason to deliver moral progress, realism defines a structured world in which the humans who live within it are unable to change the course of one state's actions against another. This problem is rooted in the fact that one state's intentions can never be truly trusted when it is being controlled by individual actors with human ideals and selfishness. In this essay I will define realism and explain why other political theories must be utilized when analyzing International Relations today. While realism guided America to the middle of the 20th century, more modern theories have began building upon its core foundations, addressing international issues in a world where its actors are more interconnected than ever before. These changing relations demand changing analysis in regards to foreign policy. Realism may fail to incorporate human compassion, morality and the importance of social constructs, but other grand theories bring a new approach to International Relations. Where structured realism was once necessary to maintaining international relations, compassionate liberalism and conscientious constructivism are now necessary to understanding the more complex relationships among nation-states.
In regards to international foreign policy, one must consider the condition of anarchy when deciding which grand theory operates best in our world. Laura Neack states in The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized Era that “anarchy, rather than human nature, [is] the starting point for [the realist] explanation of world politics” (14). International politics are ungoverned, unlike domestic relations. The nuclear arms race is an excellent example of unmitigated anarchy between nations. Had there been an international code of conduct, complete with transnational laws and regulation, the fear of Mutually Assured Destruction could have been reduced. Without such an international police unit, the actors involved in anarchy must turn to Foreign Policy Analysis to make their decisions.
Realists respond to anarchy with either military force or by forming allies. They are skeptical of any objective other than national interest and of the idea that states can escape power politics (Wohlforth 32-33). It is no surprise, then, that realists are not likely to engage in peace-seeking dialogue with other nations. But where realists are more likely to engage in military conflict to solve their problems, it is not necessarily their intention; they are opposed to first-strike wars. Realists are unwilling to accept liberal and constructivist agendas which assert that peaceful relations can be attained through democratic discussion. I find it amusing that while realists are not interested in first-strike wars, they are also not concerned with reaching out to a fellow nation in attempt to prevent an opposing strike from occurring. This is where liberal and constructivist notions can benefit International Relations.
Realism asserts that we live in a world that simply is. We cannot change the structure of our surroundings or the actions of others. Liberalism, on the other hand, claims that collaboratively, we as individuals and as fellow nation-states, can change wasteful, needless problems in the world. Constructivism goes a step further to analyze previous and current relations with others and then make positive changes accordingly. This involves both keeping a nation's personal interests intact while pursuing absolute gains collaboratively with other nations. In regards to International Relations, constructivism says we must focus on the reasons behind international players' actions (Checkel 72). Constructivists see this approach as process-oriented, not structure-oriented, as realists view foreign policy. “Process,” in this context, refers to the diverse multi-level system of actors, structures, and political analysis involved with foreign policy; these system elements consistently affect one another through their individual actions. Even though constructivists are focused on achieving peaceful relationships globally, they also understand the threat imposed by potentially dangerous nations. Constructivists closely examine the language of power actors and decide how they must adapt their world to either appease or protest those demands.
I conclude that while realism has provided our world with a stable foundation in regards to Foreign Policy Analysis, I believe that the concepts of liberalism and, more importantly, constructivism are necessary to the ever-changing worldwide discussion of International Relations.
Section 2 – Question 1:
Constructivism Beneficial to Today’s Social World
In Foreign Policy Analysis, we describe the interests of actors to be socially constructed. Since these actors are representing a collective body of individuals within a society, it is only necessary that their intentions be beneficial to the social beings they are representing. Max Weber described statism as a power that “'successfully claims for itself the monopoly of legitimate physical force within a given territory'” (Kiersey). This legitimacy is indicated by the fact that the power itself is not contested by the people. Therefore, if the individuals of a society are accepting of the actors orchestrating the power structure, they are doing so because they see the actors' intentions as mutually beneficial. Constructivists, in this context, require that we analyze the language of actors to determine their intentions, although it is not intentions that they are concerned with (Checkel 72-74). Ultimately, constructivists seek to analyze the social-driven ontology of a state and its actors to determine possible solutions to problems which may arise when interacting with other nations. Unlike realism, constructivism allows for other political theories to be utilized. In this essay, I will explain why I believe the notion of process in constructivism is more beneficial to Foreign Policy Analysis than the positivist approach, which is structure-oriented. In a world where the intentions of foreign policy actors are socially constructed, an approach, such as constructivism, which accesses various grand theories, is necessary to breeding successful international relationships.
Positivism suggests that the social realm can be studied the same as the natural realm, and that even language can be analyzed scientifically (Checkel 72). This is to say that our intentions can be determined based on what we say, but that even though we may observe and analyze our social interactions, we cannot necessarily change the outcome of them. While positivists utilize a structured, fact-based approach to foreign politics, constructivists observe the process of our interactions with one another. There is no underlying structure to our international relations, according to the constructivists; the actors themselves create the structure. Furthermore, constructivism concludes that if our ideas about each other matter, then our approach to foreign policy should be process-oriented rather than structure-based (Kiersey).
In her book The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized Era, Laura Neack explains that since WWII, the study of individuals has become as necessary as the study of rational decision-making (51). This cognitive approach helps foreign policy analysts as well as international actors better understand and be able to predict other actors’ intentions. Neack cites Jerel Rosati’s definition of this approach: ‘A cognitive approach assumes a complex, and realistic, psychology about human reasoning and decision-making. It does not assume individual awareness, open-mindedness, and adaptability relative to an “objective” environment, but assumes individuals are likely to view their environment differently and operate within their own “psychological environment”’ (51).
In my opinion, neither realism nor liberalism benefits foreign policy as much as constructivism. Neack also seems to suggest this theory. Realism ignores the fact that human beings are operating in a world in which they psychologically create the environment around them. Bringing all of their life experiences to the table, actors construct their own reality, proving that they do not function in a structured world. Liberalism expects individuals to be open-minded and ever-progressive, but when these ideals are encouraged, individuals are just as likely to hold fast to their private interests and human selfishness as they are to work cooperatively with others to accomplish an end result. Constructivism, which incorporates attributes of each grand theory, is ultimately the best approach to analyzing and defining International Relations in today’s globalized world.
Section 3:
Mearsheimer and Walt Prove Foreign Policy Analysis Should Be Process-Based
In Foreign Policy Analysis, we utilize the terms “process” and “policy” to describe two different approaches to examining International Relations. “Process” refers to a chaotic ensemble of actors and structures working across a variety of levels with said actors constructing the world they live in. “Policy,” on the other hand, describes the act of explaining International Relations in terms of one grand theory or another (Kiersey). For John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, the authors of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, realism is the grand theory of choice. Both men are undeniably advocates of realism, and attempt to explain the lobby's affect on International Relations through a policy-based approach that is undeniably realist in nature. The irony in Mearsheimer and Walt's attempt is that by elaborating the complexity of the Israel Lobby in International Relations, they have disputed their own preferred grand theory. Herein, I will explain how, through the realist, policy-based lens, Mearsheimer and Walt have contradicted themselves and proven that a process-based approach is necessary in Foreign Policy Analysis today.
According to Mearsheimer and Walt, “The lobby is a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively works to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction” (13). This coalition, they claim, is a primary cause for the U.S. setting aside its own security in order to advance the interests of another state. Mearsheimer and Walt's advocacy for realism begins to unravel with The Israel Lobby's thesis. Realism, by definition, asserts that the structure of a state's domestic politics has little or no impact on International Relations, which are in a constant state of anarchy. It claims that all states act defensively to maximize either their security or their relative power, but opposes first-strike wars (Wohlforth 32-34). In chapters eight and ten, the authors cite domestic issues as the force leading the U.S. into an unnecessary war with Iraq, and directly blame the Israel Lobby for the more recent threat of war with Iran. If Mearsheimer and Walt are correct, and the Israel Lobby has the power to manipulate the national interests of both U.S. and Israel, then domestic foreign policy must certainly be important to the discussion of International Relations, and the grand theory of realism is no longer valid.
Mearsheimer and Walt admit their frustration at attempting to explain the U.S.'s involvement in Israel through a realist lens: “Having established that neither strategic interests nor moral rationales can fully explain U.S. support for Israel, we turn our attention to that 'something else'”(15-16). Throughout the book, the authors address issues like the exchange of and international demand for oil, the lobby's manipulation of the media and politicians, the academic watch program implemented by the lobby, and a dwindling moral case in Israel juxtaposed with increasing U.S. support for the state. But while Mearsheimer and Walt address these important domestic issues, they, for the most part, fail to address the interpersonal and cultural aspects of the Israel Lobby. This is where a process-based approach to foreign policy would benefit the authors' debate. Undoubtedly, because Israel is uniquely tied to a variety of religious institutions, the notion of religion (obviously a social element), must not be ignored.
Mearsheimer and Walt approach the Israel Lobby debate through a very narrow system of analysis. Guided by realism, the authors fail to incorporate a variety of political theories to describe the complexities of the Israel Lobby and its impact on International Relations. Their biggest blunder is insisting that the Israel Lobby has made a significant impact on domestic policy in both the U.S. and Israel. This notion fundamentally opposes realism, which asserts that domestic policy has no impact on International Relations. The authors blame the lobby for manipulating the foreign policy objectives of both nations, claiming that both states' national security has been threatened by it. This is where Mearsheimer and Walt's fallacy is clear: If a nation's foreign policy objectives have been captured then domestic policy must indeed be important to International Relations. Nonetheless, the authors prove that Foreign Policy Analysis is too complex to define with one grand theory, and that a process-based approach is imperative to understanding International Relations.
Works Cited
Checkel, Jeffrey T. “Constructivism and Foreign Policy.” Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. Ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. 72.
Kiersey, Nicholas. Ohio University-Chillicothe, Chillicothe, Ohio. Jan.-Feb. 2009.
Mearsheimer, John and Walt, Stephen. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.
Neack, Laura.The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized Era. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008.
Wohlforth, William C. “Realism and Foreign Policy.” Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. Ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. 32-34.
Today's World Demanding of Theories Outside of Realism
Realism, the core of International Relations theory, has provided a stable backdrop for those involved in foreign policy decisions to build upon. Skeptical about the capacity of human reason to deliver moral progress, realism defines a structured world in which the humans who live within it are unable to change the course of one state's actions against another. This problem is rooted in the fact that one state's intentions can never be truly trusted when it is being controlled by individual actors with human ideals and selfishness. In this essay I will define realism and explain why other political theories must be utilized when analyzing International Relations today. While realism guided America to the middle of the 20th century, more modern theories have began building upon its core foundations, addressing international issues in a world where its actors are more interconnected than ever before. These changing relations demand changing analysis in regards to foreign policy. Realism may fail to incorporate human compassion, morality and the importance of social constructs, but other grand theories bring a new approach to International Relations. Where structured realism was once necessary to maintaining international relations, compassionate liberalism and conscientious constructivism are now necessary to understanding the more complex relationships among nation-states.
In regards to international foreign policy, one must consider the condition of anarchy when deciding which grand theory operates best in our world. Laura Neack states in The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized Era that “anarchy, rather than human nature, [is] the starting point for [the realist] explanation of world politics” (14). International politics are ungoverned, unlike domestic relations. The nuclear arms race is an excellent example of unmitigated anarchy between nations. Had there been an international code of conduct, complete with transnational laws and regulation, the fear of Mutually Assured Destruction could have been reduced. Without such an international police unit, the actors involved in anarchy must turn to Foreign Policy Analysis to make their decisions.
Realists respond to anarchy with either military force or by forming allies. They are skeptical of any objective other than national interest and of the idea that states can escape power politics (Wohlforth 32-33). It is no surprise, then, that realists are not likely to engage in peace-seeking dialogue with other nations. But where realists are more likely to engage in military conflict to solve their problems, it is not necessarily their intention; they are opposed to first-strike wars. Realists are unwilling to accept liberal and constructivist agendas which assert that peaceful relations can be attained through democratic discussion. I find it amusing that while realists are not interested in first-strike wars, they are also not concerned with reaching out to a fellow nation in attempt to prevent an opposing strike from occurring. This is where liberal and constructivist notions can benefit International Relations.
Realism asserts that we live in a world that simply is. We cannot change the structure of our surroundings or the actions of others. Liberalism, on the other hand, claims that collaboratively, we as individuals and as fellow nation-states, can change wasteful, needless problems in the world. Constructivism goes a step further to analyze previous and current relations with others and then make positive changes accordingly. This involves both keeping a nation's personal interests intact while pursuing absolute gains collaboratively with other nations. In regards to International Relations, constructivism says we must focus on the reasons behind international players' actions (Checkel 72). Constructivists see this approach as process-oriented, not structure-oriented, as realists view foreign policy. “Process,” in this context, refers to the diverse multi-level system of actors, structures, and political analysis involved with foreign policy; these system elements consistently affect one another through their individual actions. Even though constructivists are focused on achieving peaceful relationships globally, they also understand the threat imposed by potentially dangerous nations. Constructivists closely examine the language of power actors and decide how they must adapt their world to either appease or protest those demands.
I conclude that while realism has provided our world with a stable foundation in regards to Foreign Policy Analysis, I believe that the concepts of liberalism and, more importantly, constructivism are necessary to the ever-changing worldwide discussion of International Relations.
Section 2 – Question 1:
Constructivism Beneficial to Today’s Social World
In Foreign Policy Analysis, we describe the interests of actors to be socially constructed. Since these actors are representing a collective body of individuals within a society, it is only necessary that their intentions be beneficial to the social beings they are representing. Max Weber described statism as a power that “'successfully claims for itself the monopoly of legitimate physical force within a given territory'” (Kiersey). This legitimacy is indicated by the fact that the power itself is not contested by the people. Therefore, if the individuals of a society are accepting of the actors orchestrating the power structure, they are doing so because they see the actors' intentions as mutually beneficial. Constructivists, in this context, require that we analyze the language of actors to determine their intentions, although it is not intentions that they are concerned with (Checkel 72-74). Ultimately, constructivists seek to analyze the social-driven ontology of a state and its actors to determine possible solutions to problems which may arise when interacting with other nations. Unlike realism, constructivism allows for other political theories to be utilized. In this essay, I will explain why I believe the notion of process in constructivism is more beneficial to Foreign Policy Analysis than the positivist approach, which is structure-oriented. In a world where the intentions of foreign policy actors are socially constructed, an approach, such as constructivism, which accesses various grand theories, is necessary to breeding successful international relationships.
Positivism suggests that the social realm can be studied the same as the natural realm, and that even language can be analyzed scientifically (Checkel 72). This is to say that our intentions can be determined based on what we say, but that even though we may observe and analyze our social interactions, we cannot necessarily change the outcome of them. While positivists utilize a structured, fact-based approach to foreign politics, constructivists observe the process of our interactions with one another. There is no underlying structure to our international relations, according to the constructivists; the actors themselves create the structure. Furthermore, constructivism concludes that if our ideas about each other matter, then our approach to foreign policy should be process-oriented rather than structure-based (Kiersey).
In her book The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized Era, Laura Neack explains that since WWII, the study of individuals has become as necessary as the study of rational decision-making (51). This cognitive approach helps foreign policy analysts as well as international actors better understand and be able to predict other actors’ intentions. Neack cites Jerel Rosati’s definition of this approach: ‘A cognitive approach assumes a complex, and realistic, psychology about human reasoning and decision-making. It does not assume individual awareness, open-mindedness, and adaptability relative to an “objective” environment, but assumes individuals are likely to view their environment differently and operate within their own “psychological environment”’ (51).
In my opinion, neither realism nor liberalism benefits foreign policy as much as constructivism. Neack also seems to suggest this theory. Realism ignores the fact that human beings are operating in a world in which they psychologically create the environment around them. Bringing all of their life experiences to the table, actors construct their own reality, proving that they do not function in a structured world. Liberalism expects individuals to be open-minded and ever-progressive, but when these ideals are encouraged, individuals are just as likely to hold fast to their private interests and human selfishness as they are to work cooperatively with others to accomplish an end result. Constructivism, which incorporates attributes of each grand theory, is ultimately the best approach to analyzing and defining International Relations in today’s globalized world.
Section 3:
Mearsheimer and Walt Prove Foreign Policy Analysis Should Be Process-Based
In Foreign Policy Analysis, we utilize the terms “process” and “policy” to describe two different approaches to examining International Relations. “Process” refers to a chaotic ensemble of actors and structures working across a variety of levels with said actors constructing the world they live in. “Policy,” on the other hand, describes the act of explaining International Relations in terms of one grand theory or another (Kiersey). For John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, the authors of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, realism is the grand theory of choice. Both men are undeniably advocates of realism, and attempt to explain the lobby's affect on International Relations through a policy-based approach that is undeniably realist in nature. The irony in Mearsheimer and Walt's attempt is that by elaborating the complexity of the Israel Lobby in International Relations, they have disputed their own preferred grand theory. Herein, I will explain how, through the realist, policy-based lens, Mearsheimer and Walt have contradicted themselves and proven that a process-based approach is necessary in Foreign Policy Analysis today.
According to Mearsheimer and Walt, “The lobby is a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that actively works to move U.S. foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction” (13). This coalition, they claim, is a primary cause for the U.S. setting aside its own security in order to advance the interests of another state. Mearsheimer and Walt's advocacy for realism begins to unravel with The Israel Lobby's thesis. Realism, by definition, asserts that the structure of a state's domestic politics has little or no impact on International Relations, which are in a constant state of anarchy. It claims that all states act defensively to maximize either their security or their relative power, but opposes first-strike wars (Wohlforth 32-34). In chapters eight and ten, the authors cite domestic issues as the force leading the U.S. into an unnecessary war with Iraq, and directly blame the Israel Lobby for the more recent threat of war with Iran. If Mearsheimer and Walt are correct, and the Israel Lobby has the power to manipulate the national interests of both U.S. and Israel, then domestic foreign policy must certainly be important to the discussion of International Relations, and the grand theory of realism is no longer valid.
Mearsheimer and Walt admit their frustration at attempting to explain the U.S.'s involvement in Israel through a realist lens: “Having established that neither strategic interests nor moral rationales can fully explain U.S. support for Israel, we turn our attention to that 'something else'”(15-16). Throughout the book, the authors address issues like the exchange of and international demand for oil, the lobby's manipulation of the media and politicians, the academic watch program implemented by the lobby, and a dwindling moral case in Israel juxtaposed with increasing U.S. support for the state. But while Mearsheimer and Walt address these important domestic issues, they, for the most part, fail to address the interpersonal and cultural aspects of the Israel Lobby. This is where a process-based approach to foreign policy would benefit the authors' debate. Undoubtedly, because Israel is uniquely tied to a variety of religious institutions, the notion of religion (obviously a social element), must not be ignored.
Mearsheimer and Walt approach the Israel Lobby debate through a very narrow system of analysis. Guided by realism, the authors fail to incorporate a variety of political theories to describe the complexities of the Israel Lobby and its impact on International Relations. Their biggest blunder is insisting that the Israel Lobby has made a significant impact on domestic policy in both the U.S. and Israel. This notion fundamentally opposes realism, which asserts that domestic policy has no impact on International Relations. The authors blame the lobby for manipulating the foreign policy objectives of both nations, claiming that both states' national security has been threatened by it. This is where Mearsheimer and Walt's fallacy is clear: If a nation's foreign policy objectives have been captured then domestic policy must indeed be important to International Relations. Nonetheless, the authors prove that Foreign Policy Analysis is too complex to define with one grand theory, and that a process-based approach is imperative to understanding International Relations.
Works Cited
Checkel, Jeffrey T. “Constructivism and Foreign Policy.” Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. Ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. 72.
Kiersey, Nicholas. Ohio University-Chillicothe, Chillicothe, Ohio. Jan.-Feb. 2009.
Mearsheimer, John and Walt, Stephen. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007.
Neack, Laura.The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized Era. 2nd ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2008.
Wohlforth, William C. “Realism and Foreign Policy.” Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases. Ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008. 32-34.
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