Journal on Conor Foley's The Thin Blue Line, Chapters 1-4

Conor Foley's The Thin Blue Line: How Humanitarianism Went To War is essential to the growing debate over how to deal with humanitarian crises. It picks up immediately where Samantha Power left off, with the terrorist bombing of the UN headquarters (and subsequent death of humanitarian Sergio Vieria de Mello) in Baghdad in August 2003 (pg. 1). Foley introduces his book by explaining the controversy surrounding the US invasion of Iraq, noting that the country “descended into chaos” once we chose to invade. Foley explains two schools of through regarding the invasion. One side of the argument believes the invasion represents both a weakening of national sovereignty and attention paid to international law. These “anti-imperialists,” as he refers to them, argue that human rights and democracy can never be imposed on a people by force of arms, and that our attempt to do so is nothing more than “old-fashioned imperialism.” The second faction, the “liberal interventionists,” believe that our business in Iraq is just, and that we were responsible for bringing Saddam Hussein, a dictator known to disregard the human rights of his people, to justice (pg. 2).

Foley proceeds to discuss the political dilemma human rights and non-governmental organizations face. He explains that such NGOs typically rely on neutrality to meet their objectives when providing relief assistance during conflict and natural disasters. However, in many situations, a military presence is required to get the job done. In many situations, humanitarian relief can only be met with force against those who are inhibiting the human rights of the people. When this happens, what Foley refers to as “political humanitarianism” is the result. Like Power, he refers to Bosnia and Rwanda as incidents where the UN prolonged suffering and crimes against humanity (pg. 4).

For the purpose of my journal, and because I found this most interesting, I'm going to skip to Chapter Four's topic: Afghanistan. I was very disturbed to learn the details of our retaliation against Afghanistan following the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks of September 11, 2001. Less than a month later, through Operation Enduring Freedom, the US launched a series of air strikes against the Taliban's Northern Alliance. According to Foley, we struck on the side of the Taliban's opposing forces; we were merely helping out in a civil war. In the end, our air strikes did not prevail, but suitcases full of cash did. We simply bought off the Taliban commanders. Foley quotes journalist Bob Woodward on the incident: “'In all, the US commitment to overthrow the Taliban [was] 110 CIA officers and 316 Special Forces personnel, plus massive airpower'” (pgs. 96-97).

Foley describes Afghanistan's terrain, which is strewn across mountains, and explains how nearly impossible it is for military aircraft to identify targets on the ground. This is one reason the US has chosen to abandon the search for Taliban officials in Afghanistan. He says military officials regularly complained, “There's not much point dropping a million-dollar missile on a ten dollar tent” (pg. 95). I would imagine that if we do not have the technology to locate dangerous targets hiding in unnavigable terrain, then our military had best invest in such technologies immediately.

Even though the US did bomb Afghanistan and leave it in the hands of battling warlords, UN attempts to secure the country with peacekeeping forces were not supported. Foley cites former President Bush's comments on the matter (as given by a spokesperson in February 2002): “The President continues to believe that the purpose of [the] military is to be used to fight and win wars, and not to engage in peacekeeping of that nature” (pg. 98). First of all, the US has been a part of “peacekeeping” of that nature for decades, and we've certainly been involved in nation-building. This statement is proof that foreign policy actors can and will bend the rules to their liking. I think our abandonment of Afghanistan and invasion of Iraq makes this obvious. Foley makes an excellent case against the US' intentions for humanitarianism.


Work Cited
Foley, Conor. The Thin Blue Line: How Humanitarianism Went To War. New York: Verso, 2008.